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The ‘Jus’ of Use: Trademarks in Transition
Bita Amani & Carys Craig*
Changes to Canada’s Trade-marks Act will soon permit, for the
first time, the registration and enforcement of unused trademarks.
Far from a mere legal technicality or practical exigency, this shift
fundamentally alters the nature of trademarks and the trademark
system. Traditionally, it is the use of trade indicia in the marketplace
that determines title and acquisition of trademark rights; use that
defines the scope and duration of rights; and use that gives rise to
claims of infringement. By virtue of the ‘‘Jus of use”, the trademark
system has remained, over time, reasonably true to its rationale,
encouraging and rewarding honest economic activity and fair
competition. This article examines the implications of removing use
as a precondition of trademark registration. Not only will the
statutory amendments present stark practical problems likely to
disadvantage weaker commercial actors, but they will undermine the
basic tenets of Canada’s trademark system, casting doubt on its
historical justifications and its constitutional legitimacy. If this
reflects the international trajectory of ‘‘trademarks in transition”, it
also gives rise to an overarching concern: with the global shift towards
a right-by-registration system, consumer protection rationales
increasingly cede to market efficiency concerns, as the trademark
further (d)evolves from source signifier to simple commodity.
_________________________
Les modifications apporte´es par le Parlement canadien à la Loi
sur les marques de commerce permettront bientôt, et pour la
premie`re fois, l’enregistrement et l’application des marques de
commerce inutilise´es. Loin d’une simple technicite´ juridique ou
d’une exigence pratique, ce changement modifie fondamentalement
*
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la nature et le syste`me des marques de commerce. Traditionnellement,
c’est l’utilisation de signes ou symboles commerciaux au sein du
marche´ qui de´termine le titre et l’acquisition des droits sur une
marque de commerce, utilisation qui de´finit la porte´e et la dure´e des
droits, et qui donne lieu à des alle´gations de violation. En vertu du
«droit d’utilisation», le syste`me des marques de commerce est reste´,
au fil du temps, raisonnablement fide`le à sa raison d’eˆtre,
encourageant et re´compensant une activite´ e´conomique honneˆte et
une concurrence loyale. Dans cet article, les auteures examinent les
implications de la suppression de l’utilisation comme condition
pre´alable à l’enregistrement d’une marque. Non seulement les
modifications le´gislatives pre´senteraient de graves proble`mes
pratiques susceptibles de de´savantager les acteurs commerciaux les
plus faibles, mais elles mineraient les principes fondamentaux du
syste`me des marques de commerce au Canada, mettant en doute ses
justifications historiques et sa le´gitimite´ constitutionnelle. Si cela
refle`te la trajectoire internationale des «marques de commerce en
transition», cela suscite e´galement une inquie´tude ge´ne´rale : avec
l’e´volution mondiale vers un syste`me d’inscription des droits, les
motifs de protection des consommateurs ce`dent de plus en plus aux
pre´occupations d’efficacite´ du marche´, alors que la marque de
commerce e´volue (voire re´gresse), passant d’identificateur de
source à simple produit.
1. INTRODUCTION
Globally, trademarks are in transition. Far from the practical
signifiers of trade source that found protection in the common law
of industrializing Britain, today’s trademarks embody global
brands, encapsulate the marketing messages of international
corporations and represent billions of dollars’ worth of
commercial ‘‘goodwill.”1 Brand expansion has long been the goal
of any business but, historically, both the territoriality of trademark
law and its internal logic worked to keep the trademark proprietor
‘‘honest to his trade.” The trademark, in order to be protected by
law, had to tell a ‘‘true story” about the source of the goods or
1

The most valuable brands can be worth significantly more than the world’s
most valuable patents or copyright protected works and can dwarf the value of a
company’s tangible assets. See Grow, Change, Grow: Best Global Brands 2017,
online: Interbrand <http://interbrand.com/best-brands/best-global-brands/
2017/>.
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services to which it attached, serving to signify trade provenance in
the relevant marketplace. It was through market use of indicia such
as words, symbols and shapes that they acquired distinctive identity
and the ability to serve this source-signifying function. This
remained so even with the arrival of the trademark registration
system for, as then Chief Justice Ritchie explained in Partlo v. Todd
(1888), ‘‘[i]t is not the registration that makes the party proprietor
of a trade-mark; he must be a proprietor before he can register.”2 It
was thus the use of trade indicia that determined title and
acquisition of trademark rights; use that defined the scope of
these rights; the manner of use (or its absence) that threatened these
rights; and use that gave rise to claims of infringement. In this way,
it was the law — or jus — of use that enabled the trademark system
to incentivize honest economic activity and facilitate fair
competition. Indeed, in Canada, it was apparently the jus of use
that allowed marks, whether registered or unregistered, to be
governed by a federal statutory regime under the trade and
commerce power.3
But the law’s entrenchment of use into the legal life and
constitution(ality) of a trademark, whether in the common law or
by statute, served more than a legal function; it recognized a social
reality. Trademark use occurred in a particular commercial setting
and a specific cultural context. Historically, use was geographically
constrained and culturally contained — and so, too, was the
potential for consumer confusion, as marks could mean different
things in different markets. The jus of use was not only about
formal legal requirements but functioned to capture the essential
spirit — the au jus, if you will — of trademark protection within the
broader framework of fair competition. Mediating the boundary
between fair and unfair competition was the integral connection
between the trader’s interest (as acquired through use of a mark)
and the public’s interest in avoiding confusion (as caused by misuse
of a mark with which the public had become familiar). To the
extent that the legal regime protecting trademarks could be hailed
as a form of consumer protection legislation, it depended for its
2
3

Partlo v. Todd (1888), 17 S.C.R. 196 at 200, Ritchie C.J.
Subsection 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1876 (formerly the British North
America Act) grants legislative authority to the Federal Parliament of Canada
over ‘‘The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.” Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.),
30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(2), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5. See below,
Part 4.
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rationale on the core requirement that the mark be used in the
marketplace thereby acquiring reputation and goodwill. And, to
the extent that the legal regime could be heralded as protection for
traders against unfair competition, such competition could occur,
of course, only in the context of actual trade.
The economic value of the trademark, however, has gradually
eclipsed its social significance and cultural context, as transnational
flows of goods and capital engender national protection of marks
even in the absence of local use. Increasingly, trademark owners
assert rights in regions where they have never conducted business;
infringers are commanded to cease the use of confusing marks in
fields devoid of actual consumers to confuse; and trademarks are
protected by law in markets where they have never functioned as
marks in trade. The legal regime that protects trademark rights has
become divorced from the realities of commercial exchange and
from the interests of consumers that once occupied its core. The full
importance and practical implications of this shift are only now
beginning to be realized. The trademark system has transformed,
and its economic significance swelled, all while its foundations have
been quietly crumbling.
This article critically explores Canada’s imminent transition
from a trademark system premised on the use of marks towards a
system based on registration and free-standing rights.4 Legislative
amendments to Canada’s Trademarks Act5 currently stand poised
to precipitate the shift from a so-called ‘‘use-based” trademark
system (wherein rights to the exclusive control of a mark flow from,
and depend upon, the use of the mark as a trademark in the
marketplace) to a ‘‘registration-based” trademark system (wherein
rights can be acquired through registration even in the absence of
any commercial use of the mark). They will permit, for the first time
in Canada’s history, the registration and enforcement of unused
trademarks. Though stamped with Royal Assent, the amendments
have sat on the books for almost four years awaiting
implementation, and seem likely to be further delayed until 2019
while accompanying regulations are developed and debated.6 In the
4

5
6

Some of the content herein first appeared as commentary in Bita Amani &
Carys Craig, Trade-marks and Unfair Competition Law in Canada: Cases and
Commentary, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2014).
Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. T-13 [TMA].
See Cynthia Rowden, ‘‘Implementation of Trademarks Act Amendments —
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interim, new questions have been asked about the wisdom of the
reforms, and concerns raised about the manner of their enactment.7

7

Now Scheduled for 2019: What This Means For Brand Owners” (13 February
2017), Bereskin & Parr (blog), online: <http://www.bereskinparr.com/doc/
implementation-of-i-trademarks-act-i-amendments-now-scheduled-for-2019what-this-means-for-brand-own>. Proposed Trademark Regulations were the
subject of a recent public consultation process. See Government of Canada,
‘‘Consultations and Discussions”, online: <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr04263.html>.
With this article, we join the many Canadian intellectual property experts who
have expressed concern about the lack of consultation and the anticipated
negative impact of the amendments for Canadian businesses and consumers.
See, e.g., Daniel R. Bereskin, Q.C., ‘‘Canada’s Ill-Conceived New ‘Trademark’
Law: A Venture into Constitutional Quicksand” (2014) 104:5 Trademark
Reporter 1112 [Constitutional Quicksand]; Paul Tackaberry, ‘‘Exploring the
Boundaries of ‘Use’ After the 2014 Amendments to the Canadian Trademarks
Act” (2014) 104:6 Trademark Reporter 1322 [Exploring the Boundaries];
Sheldon Burshtein, ‘‘Canada Weakens Trademark Structure by Demolishing
Use Foundation (Commentary)” (2015) 105:4 Trademark Reporter 930;
Benjamin Lai, ‘‘Bill C-31, the Trade-marks Act Amendment and Dealing with
Trade-mark Squatting” (2015) 28 I.P.J. No. 1 at 135. See also, e.g., Julius
Melnitzer, ‘‘Canada Proposes Radical Change to Trademark Law, Lawyers
Warn” (16 April 2014) Financial Post, online: <http://business.financialpost.com/legal-post/canada-proposes-radical-change-to-trademark-law-lawyerswarn>; Cynthia Rowden, ‘‘Canada’s New Use-less Trademarks Act” The
Trademark Lawyer (October/November 2014), online: <http://www.bereskinparr.com/files/file/docs/BER_Canadas_New_Use-less_Trademarks_Act.pdf>; Michele Ballagh, ‘‘Are Your Common Law Trademarks at Risk?”
(7 November 2014), online: <https://www.ballaghedward.ca/article/are-yourcommon-law-trademarks-at-risk.php>; Stephan Abitbol, ‘‘The Canadian
Trademark Regime: Amendments to the Trade-marks Act and the Threat to
Canada and the United States,” 24 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 229; Mark
Penner & Ariel Thomas, ‘‘Updating Canadian Trademark Filing & Registration Strategies in the Face of Recent Legislative Changes” (29 Jan 2015),
Faskens (blog), online: <https://www.fasken.com/en/knowledgehub/2015/01/
intellectualpropertybulletin-20150129>; Cynthia Rowden & Daniel Bereskin,
Q.C., ‘‘Will Changes to Canada’s Trademark Laws Simplify or Complicate
Selection and Protection of New Brands?” The Trademark Lawyer (January
2016), online: <http://www.bereskinparr.com/files/file/docs/TrademarkLawyer_Issue1%202016.pdf>; Donna White, ‘‘Trademark: Trolls at the Gate—Lexpert” (3 October 2016), Osler Press Room, online: <https://
www.osler.com/en/about-us/press-room/2016/trademarks-trolls-at-the-gatelexpert>; Robert M. McDonald, ‘‘Major changes to Canada’s trademark laws:
What every business needs to know” (8 November 2016), Lexology (blog),
online: <https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e2b17a49-eb814fe3-a709-89cc1ce2acfc>. Comments on the Public Consultations on the
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This is a critical juncture at which to unpack the impending
changes. But, even if the amendments are fully implemented by the
time this article finds its way into the reader’s hands, the real
growing pains are likely still to follow. We believe that these
significant statutory changes portend a new trajectory for Canadian
trademark law writ large, departing from long established
principles and practices in the field towards a new policy terrain
— one in which trademarks will increasingly function like
commodities, while the interests of local businesses and Canadian
consumers rapidly recede from view.
The ensuing analysis will allow readers to grasp both the
substance and significance of these legislative amendments, as and
when (and subject to whatever regulations) they ultimately take
effect. The following section describes and assesses the technical
impact of the statutory changes with regard to the registration of
unused marks. Part 3 situates these changes against the backdrop of
longstanding doctrine and dicta around registrability and use in
Canada, as well as the constitutional basis for the federal regulation
of registered and unregistered marks. Part 4 then explores the
potential consequences in terms of both the constitutional
legitimacy of the revised Trademarks Act and the practical
implications that are likely to follow. Part 5 concludes with some
thoughts about the broader trends of trademarks in transition.
2. THE CANADIAN AMENDMENTS
In recent years, trademark law has been the subject of
significant attention from Canadian law and policy makers, albeit
without the public attention, debate, and scrutiny that
accompanied the copyright law reform process. 8 Important

8

Proposed Trade-marks Regulations post-amendment make ongoing concerns
apparent, online: <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr04256.html>.
The enactment of the Copyright Modernization Act, S.C. 2012, c. 20, was
preceded by extensive public consultation and debate over iterative versions of
the amending legislation (Bills C-61, C-11 and C-32). The 2009 consultation on
Bill C-61 generated more than 8,300 submissions. Even this was thought by
some, with good reason, to be insufficient: see Michael Geist, ‘‘The Government’s ‘10,000 Consultations’ on Copyright” (May 25, 2012) Michael Geist
(blog), online: <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/2012/05/10k-consultation-oncopyright/>.
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domestic developments have occurred against the backdrop of
ratification processes for several key international trademark
treaties (the Nice Agreement,9 the Singapore Treaty,10 and the
Madrid Protocol)11 as well as high-stakes international trade
negotiations (the Canada-European Union Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement). 12 Bill C-8, the Combating
Counterfeit Products Act, received Royal Assent and became law
on December 9, 2014;13 Bill C-31, the Economic Action Plan 2014
Act, No. 1, received Royal Assent on June 19, 201414 and includes,
in Division 25, ‘‘Amendments Relating to International Treaties of
Trademarks.”15
9

10

11

12

13

14

15

Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and
Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, 15 June 1957, 550 UNTS
45 (entered into force 8 April 1961, revised at Stockholm on 14 July 1967, at
Geneva on 13 May 1977 and amended on 28 September 1979; accession by
Canada at date to be determined), online: <http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/
classification/nice/> [Nice Agreement].
Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks, 27 March 2006, 2633 UNTS 3
(entered into force 16 March 2009, accession by Canada at date to be
determined) [Singapore Treaty].
Madrid Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Marks, 14 April
1891, 583 UNTS 3 (entered into force 15 July 1892, revised at Brussels on 14
December 1900, at Washington on 2 June 1911, at The Hague on 6 November
1925, at London on 2 June 1934, at Nice on 15 June 1957, at Stockholm on 14
July 1967, and amended on September 28, 1979; accession by Canada at date to
be determined) [Madrid Agreement], and the Protocol Relating to the Madrid
Agreement, 27 June 1989, (entered into force 1 December 1995, amended on 3
October 2006 and on 12 November 2007; accession by Canada at date to be
determined) [Madrid Protocol].
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement between Canada, of the one
part, and the European Union and its Member States, of the other part, 30
October 2016 (signed on October 30, 2016 and provisionally applied 21
September 2017) [CETA]. Article 20.13 obliges each Party to ‘‘. . . make all
reasonable efforts to comply with Articles 1 through 22 of the Singapore Treaty
. . .” and to accede to the Madrid Protocol.
Bill C-8, An Act to amend the Copyright Act and the Trade-marks Act and to
make consequential amendments to other Acts, 2nd Sess., 41st Parl., 2014
(assented to 9 December 2014) S.C. 2014, c. 32, online: <http://www.parl.ca/
DocumentViewer/en/41-2/bill/C-8/royal-assent> [CCPA].
Bill C-31, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in
Parliament on February 11, 2014 and other measures, 2nd Sess., 41st Parl., 2014
(assented to 19 June 2014) S.C. 2014, c. 20, online: <http://www.parl.ca/
DocumentViewer/en/41-2/bill/C-31/royal-assent> [EAPA].
Ibid. ss. 317-68. The Combating Counterfeit Products Act has now largely come
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The CCPA was a reincarnation of Bill C-56,16 which generated
controversy at the time of its introduction due to its substantive
connection to the widely discredited and now effectively defunct
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement.17 Critics complained that it
was essentially ‘‘ACTA through the back door.”18 In addition to
provisions addressing the importation and distribution of
counterfeit goods, the CCPA amended the Trade-marks Act by
broadening the definition of ‘‘trade-mark” to cover non-traditional
trademarks and proposed certification marks,19 and replacing some
of Canada’s more idiosyncratic statutory language (e.g., ‘‘wares”
becomes ‘‘goods”).
More surprising, however, was the introduction of Bill C-31,20
which contained — tucked at the back of a 300-page budget
implementation bill — fundamental changes to the Trade-marks
Act. These changes, once implemented, will disturb the wellestablished bases for obtaining registered trademark protection in
Canada and disrupt the existing regulatory processes for trademark

16

17

18

19

20

into force, though like the EAPA, some key trademarks-related provisions
remain to be implemented.
Bill C-56, An Act to amend the Copyright Act and the Trade-marks Act and to
make consequential amendments to other Acts, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., 2013.
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, 1 October 2011 (not in force) [ACTA].
Notwithstanding its many signatories (Australia, Canada, Japan, Mexico,
Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, South Korea, the United States, and the 22
member states of the European Union) only Japan has ratified ACTA, the
coming into force of which requires ratification by six states. ACTA, art. 40.
Public protests across Europe and ACTA’s rejection by the European
Parliament (see online: <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/pressroom/20120703IPR48247/european-parliament-rejects-acta>) suggest that
the required ratifications are unlikely to materialize.
See, e.g., Michael Geist, ‘‘NDP Calls It: Bill C-56 is ‘ACTA Through the Back
Door’” (6 March 2013) Michael Geist (blog), online: <http://www.michaelgeist.ca/content/view/6800/125/>.
Subsection 7(3) amends the definition of ‘‘trade-mark” in section 2 of the TMA
to include ‘‘(a) a sign or combination of signs that is used by a person for the
purpose of distinguishing or so as to distinguish their goods or services from
those of others.” Subsection 7(5) defines ‘‘sign” as including ‘‘a word, a personal
name, a design, a letter, a numeral, a colour, a figurative element, a threedimensional shape, a hologram, a moving image, a mode of packaging goods, a
sound, a scent, a taste, a texture and the positioning of a sign.” CCPA, supra
note 13, ss. 7(3), 7(5).
EAPA, supra note 14.
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applications, opposition and enforcement. More specifically,
EAPA will, inter alia: rename the Trade-marks Act;21 expand
what may constitute a mark to include a wide variety of nontraditional marks;22 implement the Nice Classification system for
categorizing wares and services;23 simplify the application to
register by removing the need to declare a basis for the
entitlement to register;24 eliminate the requirement of ‘‘use” as
the basis or condition for registration; 25 and treat equally
applications to register marks used by local traders and marks
that have never been used anywhere, whether in Canada or another
country of origin.26
21

22

23

24

25

26

Sections 317 and 318 remove the hyphen from the longstanding Canadian
statutory nomenclature ‘‘Trade-marks.” Ibid. ss. 317, 318. We use the
hyphenated term ‘‘trade-marks” only in direct reference to current Canadian
legislation or jurisprudence as appropriate.
Section 319 revises the definition of ‘‘trademark” as did the CCPA, supra note
13 (but excludes the separate category of ‘‘a proposed trade-mark”), and
provides the same expansive definition of ‘‘sign.” Ibid. ss. 319(4)-(5).
Section 339 adds the requirement, in subsection 30(3) of the revised Trademarks
Act, that the goods or services in association with which the registration is
sought be grouped, numbered and ordered ‘‘according to the classes of the Nice
Classification. . .” Ibid. s. 339. The system, established by the Nice Agreement,
supra note 9, groups products and services into 45 numbered classes to improve
consistency and streamline registration and search processes across jurisdictions. See World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘‘About the Nice
Classification”, online: <http://www.wipo.int/classifications/nice/en/preface.html>.
Section 339 of the EAPA, replacing sections 30-33 of the Trade-marks Act,
removes the need to indicate whether an application is made based on use,
proposed use or use and registration of the mark abroad, by eliminating the
need to furnish the Registrar with a statement identifying the basis of
entitlement as currently required by paragraphs 30(1)(b)-(e). Unless added by
regulation, it will not be necessary under the revised section 30 for an applicant
to state either a date of first use or intent to use. EAPA, ibid.
Together, the changes made by EAPA sections 330 and 339 to sections 30 and 16
of the Trade-marks Act will permit unused proposed marks to proceed to
registration. EAPA section 345 removes the requirement currently contained in
section 40 of the Trade-marks Act that an applicant declare use of a proposed
mark in Canada in order for the certificate of registration to be issued. See
below, Part 3. Ibid. ss. 330, 339, 345.
Amendments to section 16 of the Trade-marks Act made by EAPA section 330
eliminate the distinction currently drawn in subsections 16(1)-(3) between an
application to register a mark that has been used or made known in Canada; a
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The ambition may have been to ease administrative burdens.
The effect, however, is to sacrifice the centrality of trademark use in
Canada’s trademark scheme. The government’s apparent
motivation was to bring Canada into line with international
standards including those of the Singapore Treaty and the Madrid
Protocol.27 It can hardly be disputed, however, that the proposed
amendments go beyond what is required by these international
agreements. As the Canadian Bar Association noted in its
submission to government, ‘‘[t]he amendments are not required to
fulfill Canada’s treaty obligations under [either treaty]. . . . [T]he
[United States] maintained its use prior to registration requirement
when acceding to both treaties.”28 Particularly, given the absence
of any clear international obligation, many query the necessity of
‘‘fixing” a long-standing system that was not broken. In Canada’s
apparent haste to align its trademark law with that of other
registration-based systems (as opposed to holding the use-based
line along with our largest trading partner), the ‘‘existing strengths
of the Canadian trade-mark system have been under-valued. . . .”29
It is one thing to remove a redundant hyphen; quite another to
remove a fundamental precondition for protection.
Let us briefly review the specific provisions that are most
relevant for our purposes. The centrality of use to the acquisition of

27

28

29

foreign-registered mark that has been used abroad; and a mark that is unused
but proposed to be used in Canada. Ibid. s. 330.
Supra notes 10 and 11. See, e.g., Government of Canada, ‘‘Public Consultations
on the Proposed Trade-marks Regulations”, online: <http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/
site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/h_wr04256.html>: ‘‘The Government
of Canada is modernizing Canada’s intellectual property (IP) framework so
that we can join five international IP treaties, including the Madrid Protocol,
Singapore Treaty and Nice Agreement. . ..”
Letter from Mala Joshi (Chair, CBA Intellectual Property Section) and John
McKeown (Chair, Trade-marks Committee, CBA IP Section to Navdeep
Bains, Minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development (24
February 2016), online: <https://www.cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=00c7074f-897a-44a4-8556-fd15b62f61d3> at 2. See also ‘‘Legal and
Technical Implications of Canadian Adherence to the Madrid Protocol”,
prepared for the Canadian Intellectual Property Office by Alan Troicuk, Senior
Counsel, Department of Justice Canada (January 2012), online: <https://
www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/vwapj/mcProtocoleMadrid-tmMadridProtocol-eng.pdf/$file/mcProtocoleMadrid-tmMadridProtocol-eng.pdf> at 63-66.
Ibid.
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rights under Canada’s registration scheme is made apparent by
section 16 of the Trade-marks Act as currently in force.
Fundamentally, entitlement to register is about being first. An
applicant must have a basis upon which to claim title to register,
and contesting claims are then resolved by establishing priority: the
party with the earliest ‘‘priority date” of entitlement has the best
title. Historically, Anglo-Canadian law has taken the position that
priority of entitlement flows from actual prior use of the mark,
while civil law jurisdictions generally established priority through
first application. Canada now has a ‘‘mixed” system whereby
entitlement is based on either use of the mark or the filing of an
application to register the mark. Subsections 16(1), (2) and (3)
establish various routes to entitlement: the applicant (or his
predecessor in title) has (1) ‘‘used” the mark in Canada or ‘‘made
known” the mark in Canada; (2) ‘‘duly registered” the mark in his
country of origin and ‘‘used” the mark in association with wares or
services; or (3) filed an application for registration of a proposed
trade-mark. While subsection 16(3) bases entitlement simply on the
application to register (the priority date being the date of filing the
application),30 the actual use of the mark remains key to
registration by virtue of the condition contained in subsection
40(2): the application may be allowed, but the trademark will be
registered only ‘‘on receipt of a declaration that the use of the trademark in Canada, in association with the wares or services specified
in the application, has been commenced. . . .”31
The basis for priority of title is established by the paragraphs to
each subsection. As between conflicting claims, the applicant with
the better right to register is the party with the earlier ‘‘priority
date.” Under subsection 16(1), an applicant who has used or made
known his mark in Canada is entitled to register the mark unless,
prior to having first so used it or made it known, it was confusing
with ‘‘(a) a trade-mark that had been previously used in Canada or
made known in Canada by any other person; (b) a trade-mark in
respect of which an application for registration had been previously
30

31

The filing date in Canada establishes the priority date in Canada, subject to
section 34, which permits the date of an application abroad to be deemed the
date of application in Canada where the Canadian application is filed within six
months of the earliest application for a substantially similar mark in a member
country of the Paris Union or the World Trade Organization. TMA, supra note
5, s. 34.
Ibid. s. 40(2).
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filed in Canada by any other person; or (c) a trade-name that had
been previously used in Canada by any other person.”32 The same
provisos appear in subsections (2) and (3).33 To summarize, then,
an applicant who has adopted a mark by virtue of having
commenced to use it in Canada or to make it known in Canada,
or by filing an application to register the mark in Canada, has
thereby established a basis on which to claim title to register the
mark in Canada; but whether the applicant has the best title to
register the mark will depend on whether any other party has
already either used, made known, or filed an application to register
the same or a confusing mark. A prior application will beat a
subsequent use; similarly, a prior use will beat a subsequent
application.34
Even in this ‘‘mixed” system, use of a mark remains key to the
acquisition of rights. Section 4 of the Trade-Marks Act provides a
technical but substantive definition of use: ‘‘a trade-mark is deemed
to be used in association with goods, if at the time of the transfer of
the property in or possession of the goods, in the normal course of
trade, it is marked on the goods themselves or on the packages in
which they are distributed or it is in any other manner so associated
with the goods that notice of the association is then given to the
person to whom the property or possession is transferred.”35 Mere
32
33

34

35

Ibid. paras. 16(1)(a)-(c).
Under subsection 16(4) an application is affected by a prior application only if it
is pending at the date of advertisement. A refused or abandoned application is
irrelevant; if it proceeded to registration the later applicant’s mark is not
registrable pursuant to paragraph 12(1)(d). A later applicant with better title
can oppose a pending application. Under subsection 16(5) prior use of a
confusing trademark or trade name will affect an application only if the
trademark or trade name has not been abandoned at the date of advertisement
of the application. Ibid. ss. 16(1)-(5).
See e.g., Masterpiece Inc. v. Alavida Lifestyles Inc., 2011 SCC 27, [2011] 2 S.C.R.
387, 2011 CarswellNat 1613 at [35], Rothstein J: ‘‘It is important to recall the
relationship between use and registration of a trade-mark. Registration itself
does not confer priority of title to a trade-mark. At common law, it was use of a
trade-mark that conferred the exclusive right to the trademark. While the
Trade-marks Act provides additional rights to a registered trade-mark holder
than were available at common law, registration is only available once the right
to the trade-mark has been established by use.”
Ibid. s. 4(1). This provision gives rise to the following conditions for establishing
use in association with wares: (1) the mark must be a trademark as defined in the
TMA; (2) the mark must be associated with the wares so that notice of the
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token or one-time use will not be sufficient to establish title.36 For
services, ‘‘[a] trade-mark is deemed to be used . . . if it is used or
displayed in the performance or advertising of those services.”37
For applications filed on the basis of use or proposed use, no
registration can issue without actual use of the mark in Canada.
Even for applications filed on the basis of ‘‘making known” in
Canada or a foreign registration, registration can issue only if the
mark has been ‘‘used in association with goods or services.”38 In

36

37

38

association is given at the point of transfer; and (3) that transfer of property or
possession must occur in the normal course of trade. See White Consolidated
Industries, Inc. v. Beam of Canada Inc., 1991 CarswellNat 214, 39 C.P.R. (3d) 94
(F.C.T.D.). See also, e.g., Bombardier Ltd. v. British Petroleum Co., 1971
CarswellNat 511, 4 C.P.R. (2d) 204 (F.C.T.D.). This definition of ‘‘use”
(imported into the s. 2 definition of a mark) has historically served to limit what
can be a trademark to marks that are visibly perceptible. See Playboy
Enterprises Inc. v. Germain, 1987 CarswellNat 680, 16 C.P.R. (3d) 517, 15
C.I.P.R. 24 (F.C.T.D.): ‘‘I am of the opinion that use of a verbal description is
not use of a trademark within the meaning of the Trade Marks Act. A ‘mark’
must be something that can be represented visually.” See also Philip Morris
Products S.A. v. Marlboro Canada Ltd., 2012 FCA 201 at [45] and [50]
[Marlboro].
See, e.g., Sequa Chemicals Inc. v. United Color & Chemicals Ltd., 1993
CarswellNat 1373, 53 C.P.R. (3d) 216 (F.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C.
refused 1994 CarswellNat 3004. On what constitutes use ‘‘in the normal course
of trade,” see also Lin Trading Co. v. CBM Kabushiki Kaisha (1988), 21 C.P.R.
(3d) 417, [1989] 1 F.C. 620, 25 F.T.R. 80 (note), 20 C.I.P.R. 1, 93 N.R. 321
(F.C.A.); Citrus Growers Assn. Ltd. v. William D. Branson Ltd. (1990), 36
C.P.R. (3d) 434, [1990] 1 F.C. 621, 32 F.T.R. 53 (F.C.T.D.).
TMA, supra note 5, s. 4(2). The definition of use in respect of service marks is
potentially broader than use in respect of wares given the absence of an explicit
‘‘normal course of trade” requirement. Uses merely ancillary to the sale of
goods, such as on invoices or in correspondence, have been held to satisfy
subsection 4(2). See, e.g., Hartco. Enterprises Inc. v. Becterm Inc., 1989
CarswellNat 509, 23 C.I.P.R. 267. The advertising of services in Canada has
been held not to be sufficient use in the absence of services delivered in Canada.
See, e.g., Porter v. Don the Beachcomber, 1966 CarswellNat 37, [1966] Ex. C.R.
982. Questions remain as to when the use of a trademark on the Internet can
constitute ‘‘use” in Canada under subsection 4(2). See, e.g., Express File Inc. v.
HRB Royalty Inc., 2005 FC 542, 2005 CarswellNat 994, 273 F.T.R. 82 (Eng.),
39 C.P.R. (4th) 59 (F.C.); HomeAway.com Inc. v. Hrdlicka, 2012 FC 1467, 423
F.T.R. 156 (Eng.), 2012 CarswellNat 5339 (F.C.). Despite these discrepancies
and uncertainties, this section was untouched by the amendments.
Under section 5, ‘‘[a] trade-mark is deemed to be made known in Canada by a
person only if it is used by that person in a country of the Union, other than
Canada, in association with goods or services, and (a) the goods are distributed
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any case, an applicant must provide, in the application, either the
date of first use of the mark in Canada, the name of the country in
which the mark has been used in association with the relevant
goods or services, or in the case of a proposed mark, a statement
that the applicant intends to use the trademark in Canada.39 The
current position can be summed up thus: ‘‘[i]n order to obtain a
registration for a trademark in Canada, there must be use. The use
does not necessarily have to be in Canada and it does not have to be
under way at the time the application is filed, but ultimately, at
least by the end of the registration process, there must be use.”40
Support for the proposition that Canada’s trademark regime is
fundamentally use-based is also found in the statutory grounds for
invalidity and expungement of registered marks. One cannot simply
occupy the mark on the register. The registered owner must ensure
that the trademark continues to function as a trademark that
distinguishes source,41 and must use the mark substantially as
registered or risk having it challenged as invalid for

39
40

41

in association with it in Canada, or (b). . .advertised in association with it” in
Canadian printed publications or radio broadcasts, through which it has
‘‘become well known in Canada.” Subsection 16(2) requires use of the foreignregistered mark within the meaning of section 4. Ibid. ss. 5, 16(2). Section 5
reflects Canada’s obligations under article 6bis of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, while subsection 16(2) is thought to satisfy
Canada’s obligations under article 6quinquies. See Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, 20 March 1883, 828 UNTS 305, 21 U.S.T.
1583 (entered into force 7 July 1884, revised at Brussels on December 14, 1900,
at Washington on June 2, 1911, at The Hague on November 6, 1925, at London
on June 2, 1934, at Lisbon on October 31, 1958, and at Stockholm on July 14,
1967, and amended on September 28, 1979; accession by Canada 21 August
1923) arts. 6bis, 6quinquies [Paris Convention].
TMA, ibid. paras. 30(a)-(e).
Keltie R. Sim & Margaret Ng Thow Hing, ‘‘Trademark Registration in
Canada: The Thorny Issue of Use” (2010) 100:6 Trademark Reporter 1263 at
1265.
TMA, supra note 5, s. 18(1)(b). Distinctiveness is ‘‘a question of fact with the test
being whether a clear message has been given to the public that the wares with
which the trademark is associated and used are the wares of the trade-mark
owner and not those of another party”: Bodum USA Inc. v. Meyer Housewares
Canada Inc., 2012 FC 1450, 106 C.P.R. (4th) 77, 423 F.T.R. 34 (Eng.) (F.C.) at
[14]-[15] [emphasis added], citing Philip Morris Inc. v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd.,
1985 CarswellNat 805 (F.C.T.D.) at [75]-[78], aff’d 1987 CarswellNat 702
(F.C.A.). See also Aladdin Industries Inc. v. Canadian Thermos Products Ltd.,
[1969] 2 Ex. C.R. 80 (Can. Ex. Ct.).
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abandonment.42 Even minor alternations are ‘‘playing with fire”:43
changes in the mark as used, including deviations in the quality or
source of the goods and services to which it is attached, risk
compromising the integrity of the message conveyed to consumers
and could jeopardize protection by virtue of loss of distinctiveness,
abandonment or non-use. A registered mark will not be
‘‘abandoned” if its owner can demonstrate an intention to
commence or resume using it in Canada; but it can nonetheless
be struck from the register in the absence of any actual use.44
Section 45 of the Trade-marks Act facilitates housekeeping by the
Registrar to clear the deadwood from the register. The Registrar
may at any time give notice to a registered owner requiring a sworn
affidavit or statutory declaration showing, with respect to each of
the goods or services, that the trademark was in use in Canada at
any time during the preceding three-year period. Section 45 also
allows any person, from three years following registration, to pay
the prescribed fee and make a written request to the Registrar to
give such notice. In either case, the owner has three months to
provide evidence of actual use of the mark in Canada.45 In the
absence of use or special circumstances excusing non-use, the
registration is liable to be expunged or amended accordingly.46
42

43

44

45
46

TMA, supra note 5, s. 18(1)(c). This is subject to section 41, which allows a
registrant to request a cancellation of the registration or enter permitted
changes. Ibid. s. 41. To establish abandonment, the challenging party must
establish that the registered mark is no longer in use in Canada and an intention
to abandon the mark. See J.A. & M. Cote Ltee v. B.F. Goodrich Co. (1949), 14
C.P.R. 33 at 58. An abandoned mark will always be an unused one, but an
unused mark may not always be abandoned.
Promafil Canada Ltee v. Musingwear Inc. (1992), 44 C.P.R. (3d) 59 at [38]
(F.C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused (1993), 156 N.R. 240 (note), 47
C.P.R. (3d) v (note) (S.C.C.).
See Teresa Scassa, Canadian Trademark Law, 2nd ed., (Toronto: Lexis Nexis,
2015) at 339-54. Not just any use will do: use must not be a mere ‘‘token use”;
and it must be of the mark as registered. See e.g., Padcon Ltd. v. Gowling Lafleur
Henderson LLP, 2015 FC 943(F.C.), online <https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/fct/
doc/2015/2015fc943/2015fc943.html>. See also Kerri, Grainger et al., ‘‘Tricky
Trademark Use Issues: United States and Canada” (15 February 2013) vol. 68
No. 4 INTA Bulletin, online: <https://www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/
TrickyTrademarkUseIssuesUnitedStatesandCanada.aspx>.
TMA, supra note 5, s. 45(1).
Ibid. s. 45(3). See, e.g., Scott Paper Ltd. v. Smart & Biggar, 2008 FCA 129, 65
C.P.R. (4th) 303, 291 D.L.R. (4th) 660, 377 N.R. 173 (F.C.A.).
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In combination, these statutory requirements for obtaining and
retaining a valid trademark registration reflect the centrality of use
in Canada’s trademark system. As Paul Tackaberry explains:
‘‘[b]ecause trademarks are symbols of source and/or quality, they
do not exist in the abstract, but only in the marketplace (that is, as a
result of use in Canada or, in the case of former subsection 16(2),
outside Canada).”47 Tackaberry suggests that the threshold
requirement for use is therefore comparable to the fixation
requirement in copyright law or the utility doctrine in patent law,
each of which ensures that intellectual property protection does not
attach to subject matter that is ‘‘merely conceptual.”48 Indeed, we
would go one step further to suggest that, in the Anglo-Canadian
trademark tradition, use occupies a role roughly equivalent to
copyright’s core doctrine of originality, going as it does not only to
the form in which the work must exist, but to the very nature of the
thing and the reason for its protection by law. Just as the doctrine
of originality determines authorship in copyright law (and so is the
sine qua non for copyright protection),49 use is what allows a mark
to perform its communicative function — that is, distinguishing
trade source in the marketplace — and so is the sine qua non for
trademark protection. It is the use of a trademark in the
marketplace that effectively ‘‘authors” the mark—and thereby
authorizes its private enclosure.
The central role that use has played in the acquisition and
maintenance of rights is, however, now cast into doubt. As
amended, subsection 16(1) will provide that
[a]ny applicant who has filed an application in accordance with
subsection 30(2) for the registration of a registrable trademark is
entitled. . .to secure its registration in respect of the goods or
services specified in the application, unless at the filing date of
the application or the date of first use of the trademark in
Canada, whichever is earlier, it was confusing with (a) a trademark that had been previously used in Canada or made known
in Canada by any other person; (b) a trade-mark in respect of
which an application for registration had been previously filed
in Canada by any other person; or (c) a trade-name that had
been previously used in Canada by any other person.50
47
48
49

Tackaberry, supra note 7 at 1333.
Ibid.
Cp. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991),
at 10].
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Simply put, the new basis for entitlement to register will be the
filing of an application to register. The amended Act will no longer
distinguish between marks that have been used in Canada and
those registered abroad or merely proposed to be used.
Applications for registrable marks will be able to proceed directly
to registration without any need to commence or declare use51 —
and so, without ever having been used anywhere.
While first use will persist as ground for asserting priority,52 and
extended non-use will continue to be a basis for expungement,53 the
coming into force of EAPA would remove the role of actual use as
the foundation and precondition of the trademark owner’s claim to
right under the registration system. In this way, it would also widen
the gap (both in practice and principle) between the registered
trademark scheme and the common law protection against passing
off. The common law protects only marks that have been used in
such a way as to have acquired reputation and goodwill in the
relevant marketplace.54 As things stand, the registered trademark
system protects only marks that have been ‘‘used. . .for the purpose
of distinguishing or so as to distinguish the source of wares of
services.”55 A mark that has not been used cannot be protected
under either system, while the protection of a mark can be
understood, in both systems, to confirm title established through
use. Under the law as amended, rights that flow through the
registered trademark scheme will lose this intimate connection to
common law title. An applicant will become an owner of a
registered mark before he establishes himself as a ‘‘proprietor”
through use of the mark.
This shift in the law also undermines the source identifying
function of a trademark as a precondition for its registrability. To
be sure, distinctiveness will remain a condition for registration.56
While marks can be ‘‘inherently distinctive” and so be ‘‘adapted so
50
51
52
53
54

55
56

TMA, supra note 5, s. 16(1) as amended by EAPA, supra note 14, s. 330(1).
EAPA s. 345 repeals section 40 of the TMA. EAPA, ibid. s. 345.
Per TMA, supra note 5, s. 16(1)(a), as amended by EAPA, ibid. s. 330.
Per TMA, ibid. s. 45, as amended by EAPA, ibid. s. 349.
Consumers Distributing Co. v. Seiko Time Canada Ltd., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 583,
1984 CarswellOnt 869; Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., [1992] 3 S.C.R.
120, 1992 CarswellOnt 1007, 44 C.P.R. (3d) 289.
TMA, supra note 5, s. 2.
EAPA s. 345 adds, into subsection 37(1) of the TMA, that the Registrar shall
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to distinguish” source prior to actual use, the use criteria for
registration currently ensures that a registered mark actually
functions as a trademark (that is, being used for the purpose of
or so as to distinguish trade source) before it can secure the
significant advantages that registration confers.57 One might have
expected this ‘‘use of use” to become increasingly important given
the newly expanded definition of a mark to include non-traditional
signs that may have multiple meanings as signifiers (scents, sounds,
location of designs) as well as multiple non-signifying functions
(including aesthetic functionality). Where the scent of a household
cleaner, say, performs the functional task of making a cleaned
surface smell nice, the scent is used as a feature of the product but
not necessarily ‘‘used” in the trademark sense to distinguish source.
Similarly, the placement of a stripe along the sole of a shoe could
perform the aesthetic function of making it more attractive, and/or
the trademark function of distinguishing source.58 A lack of
attention to trademark use in determining the registrability of such
non-traditional marks, in particular, could exacerbate the risk of
registering functional product features as trademarks when they do
not operate as such in the minds of consumers.59 The likely result is

57

58

59

refuse an application for the registration of a trademark if satisfied that ‘‘(d) the
trademark is not distinctive.” EAPA, ibid. s. 345.
See G.F. Henderson, gen. ed., Trade-Marks Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell,
1993) at 84; David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law: Copyrights, Patents,
Trade-marks, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at 434; Amani & Craig, supra
note 4 at 275-77.
This is reflected in the current practice of the Registrar: ‘‘At present, a mark
which is primarily functional or. . .which consists of ornamentation applied to
goods for the purpose of enhancing the appearance of the goods is not
necessarily proper subject matter for a registrable trademark.” CIPO Trademark Examination Manual, Section IV.2, online: <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/
site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr03636.html#iv.2>. See also, CIPO
Practice Notice on Three-Dimensional Marks (2000), online: <http://
www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr00183.html>. See,
e.g., Adidas (Canada) Ltd. v. Collins Inc. (1978), 38 C.P.R. (2d) 145, 1978
CarswellNat 690.
In opposition proceedings regarding an application to register colour placement on a pill sheet, Member Flewelling observed: ‘‘The Mark is of a nontraditional nature which makes it more difficult for the applicant to establish
that it has been using the Mark as a trade-mark. Contrary to traditional trademarks (i.e., words, logos, slogans) it will arguably be less obvious when colours
are applied to the surface of a product that they are acting as a trademark. . ..”
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not only the unwarranted registration of non-marks, but also the
monopolization of functional features with potentially anticompetitive consequences.60
In theory, at least, the requirement of distinctiveness should
mitigate this risk. Under the revised Act, the Registrar may request
that the applicant furnish evidence ‘‘that the trademark is
distinctive at the date of the application for its registration” in
various contexts, including where the application is for nontraditional marks61 or where the ‘‘Registrar’s preliminary view is
that the trademark is not inherently distinctive.”62 However, this
suggests that the request for evidence of distinctiveness is subject to
the Registrar’s discretion,63 and that a trademark that is not
inherently distinctive may nonetheless be registrable with evidence
of its distinctiveness. In light of the amendment to the definition of
‘‘trademark,” it seems possible that distinctiveness could be
established even in the absence of any technical ‘‘use” in Canada
(by virtue of the advertising of goods, for example, or demonstrated
reputation abroad).64

60

61
62
63

64

Distrimedic Inc. v. Richards Packaging Inc., 2012 TMOB 199, 108 C.P.R. (4th)
33, 2012 CarswellNat 4873 (T.M. Opp. Bd.) at [27] [emphasis in original]. The
Board found that the Applicant had failed to establish either trademark use or
distinctiveness by virtue of the design’s uniqueness or ‘‘through use such that
consumers associated the Applicant’s Wares with a single source of manufacture or supply.” Ibid. at [53], citing Novopharm Ltd. v. Bayer Inc. (1999), 3
C.P.R. (4th) 305 (F.C.T.D.). Use, both as a precondition of registration and a
component of distinctiveness, was key to preventing the registration of this
functional, non-traditional get-up.
An interested party could, by application to the Federal Court, seek the
expungement of a registration that is likely to unreasonably limit the
development of any art or industry. EAPA, ibid. s. 331, adds section 18.1,
which essentially replaces subsection 13(3) of the TMA, supra note 5. Under
paragraph 13(1)(b) of the TMA, a distinguishing guise was registrable only if
‘‘not likely unreasonably to limit the development of any art or industry.” The
repeal of this paragraph by section 327 of the EAPA, supra note 14, places the
burden of limiting overbroad claims on private parties seeking expungement
rather than the Registrar at the time of application.
TMA, supra note 5, ss. 32(1)(c)-(d), as amended by EAPA, ibid. s. 339.
EAPA, ibid. s. 339, replacing the current s. 32 provision.
EAPA did, however, add as an explicit basis upon which the Registrar ‘‘shall
refuse an application for registration” paragraph 37(1)(d): that ‘‘the trade-mark
is not distinctive.” Ibid. s. 342(2).
Section 2 of the TMA currently defines ‘‘distinctive,” in relation to a trademark,
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Under the amended law, an applicant will not be required to
state the date of first use in the application, even if the mark has in
fact already been used in Canada. While a prior user will still have
priority over a later user or applicant to register, it is unclear how
would-be opponents will know whether they have an entitlement
claim worth pursuing. Nor will the applicant for a proposed mark
need to include a statement that it ‘‘intends to use the trade-mark in
Canada.”65 This potentially narrows the scope for alleging false
claims of use to invalidate a registration. Nevertheless, if an
applicant under the revised regime is not using the mark and does
not intend to use the mark, the statement that the trademark is used
or proposed to be used, as required under the revised paragraph
30(2)(a), should constitute a false or bad faith statement
invalidating the registration. A lack of intent to use may also be
raised as a new ground of opposition under paragraph
38(2)(e):‘‘. . .at the filing date of the application in Canada,
the applicant was not using and did not propose to use the
trade-mark in Canada. . . .” This affords at least a limited
means by which to stymie bad faith efforts to register marks in
the absence of any genuine intent to use. It is unclear, however, on
what kind of evidence an opponent could satisfy the Registrar of an
absence of intent to use; proving a negative is challenging at the
best of times, and likely to be harder still with regard to something
as subjective and unknowable as the applicant’s future intentions.
To require such proof from an opposing party shifts the burden
away from the Trademarks Office and onto the shoulders of private
citizens.
Significantly, while the proposed law reforms will remove use as
the basis for registration of a mark, they will not impact the use
analysis when the validity of a mark is challenged for abandonment

65

as meaning ‘‘a trade-mark that actually distinguishes the goods or services in
association with which it is used by its owner from the goods or services of others
or is adapted so to distinguish them.” TMA, supra note 5, s. 2 (‘‘distinctive”).
Because the definition of ‘‘trademarks” will include ‘‘a sign or combination of
signs that is proposed to be used by a person for the purpose of distinguishing”
their goods or services, there is at least technically no requirement that a mark
has been ‘‘used” within the meaning of section 4 in order to establish the
necessary distinctiveness to register.
This requirement is currently contained in paragraph 30(1)(e) of the TMA. Ibid.
s. 30(1)(e).
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or its expungement sought for non-use.66 Technical use in Canada
will remain essential to retaining registration over time. Section 45
summary expungement proceedings for non-use will, however, be
subject to limited but substantive reform.67 As well as insulating the
registered owner from the requirement to furnish evidence of use
for three years following registration, the EAPA would give the
Registrar new discretion to limit the request to specific goods or
services rather than requiring evidence for ‘‘each of the wares or
services specified in the registration” as currently required. 68
Typically, section 45 proceedings are initiated upon request,
however, and so the burden falls on private actors to proactively
clear unused marks through a costly procedure.69 Furthermore,
with the removal of use as a requirement of registration, there is
nothing on the face of the Act to prevent an owner whose mark has
been expunged for non-use from immediately applying to reregister the mark.70 Even without commencing use, in the absence
of any intervening third party use, the expunged mark could be
66

67
68

69

70

That ‘‘the trademark has been abandoned” remains a ground for invalidity
under paragraph 18(1)(c) of the TMA. See supra, note 42.
TMA, ibid. s. 45(1) as amended by EAPA, supra note 14, s. 349.
Section 45 currently allows the Registrar to seek evidence of use of the mark by a
registered owner ‘‘at any time.” EAPA section 349 amends section 45 to place
the Registrar on equal footing with third parties, having to wait until ‘‘after
three years beginning on the day on which a trademark is registered” to request
an affidavit or statutory declaration showing use of the mark. Further
procedural requirements are provided for in ss. 45(2)-(2.2) as amended by
EAPA, ibid.
See Canadian Intellectual Property Office (CIPO), ‘‘Section 45 Proceedings”,
online: <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/
h_wr01843.html#overall>.
As Tara Aaron and Axel Nordemann explain (citing GC judgment of December
13, 2012, in case T-136/11, pelicantravel.com s.r.o. v. OHIM [PELIKAN], [27];
and CJEU, judgment of June 11, 2009, in case C-529/07, Chocoladefabriken
Lindt & Sprtingli AG v. Franz Hauswirth GmbH [Goldhase], [44]), a Community
Trademark application that simply repeats a previous CTM application to
attempt to circumvent the use requirement will usually be deemed a bad-faith
application. Tara M. Aaron & Axel Nordemann, ‘‘The Concepts of Use of a
Trademark under European Union and United States Trademark Law” (2014)
104:6 Trademark Reporter 1186 at 1232-33. Such a conclusion could be
available in Canada, although it is not expressly provided for in the amended
legislation. Similarly, bad faith false declarations of use have been held to
invalidate registration, without explicit statutory basis: e.g., Unitel Communications Inc. v. Bell Canada (1995), 61 C.P.R. (3d) 12 (Fed. T.D.), cited in
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validly re-registered on the basis that the former registrant still
proposes to use it. Finally, it should be noted, in the absence of any
section 45 notice or claim of invalidity, an unused mark can
continue to reside on the register indefinitely. Section 46 was
revised to require renewal of registration after 10 years (rather than
15), but nothing in the amendments makes such renewal dependent
upon a demonstration — or even a declaration — of use.71
It bears emphasis that these foundational changes to the Trademarks Act have been presented to the public as mere technicalities
in service of a more streamlined and efficient registration system,
allowing Canada to ‘‘catch up” with its trading partners and
international practices.72 In fact, these changes implicate an
important matter of principle: they rewrite the jus of use in our
trademark law; and they undercut the use of use as a threshold and
mediating factor in the regulation of registered trademarks. Nor is
there a readily discernible benefit to be gained by the Canadian
public from the changes: the increased ease with which foreign
traders may register and protect proposed marks in Canada will not
necessarily translate into an increased quantity or quality of wares
or services offered to Canadian consumers (indeed, the opposite
may be true). That such changes have been made without the
fulsome public deliberation one would expect from the
parliamentary process in a liberal democracy makes them all the
more worrisome, particularly given their potential to adversely
impact local entrepreneurs and public interests. If implemented in
their current form, these changes will necessarily precipitate a
fundamental shift in how we understand and rationalize trademark
protection. It will become imperative to reconsider questions
regarding the constitutionality — and general legitimacy — of the
federal scheme. With this groundwork laid, we now turn to review
the role played by the jus of use in producing the socially desirable
market behaviours and economic activity that have traditionally

71
72

Miranda Aluminum Inc. v. Miranda Windows & Doors Inc., 2009 CarswellNat
1935, 2009 FC 669.
EAPA, supra note 14, s. 350.
See, e.g., Canadian Intellectual Property Office [CIPO], ‘‘Trademarks legislative changes and International Treaties”, online <https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/
site/cipointernet-internetopic.nsf/eng/wr03964.html>: ‘‘Participation in the
international treaties will modernize Canada’s IP systems to better align with
international best practices, reduce the administrative burden for innovative
Canadian businesses, and draw foreign investment to Canada.”
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provided the rationale for trademark protection in the AngloCanadian system and under federal constitutional power.
3. THE JUS OF USE
The underpinnings of trade identity law developed through the
common law in response to the needs and demands of merchants,
their competitors, and customers. Canada, like other countries that
derived their legal systems from the United Kingdom, has based
protection for trade identity and marks on use of a mark or other
indicia and the resultant goodwill that such use generates.73
Trademarks in Canada are thus protected both at common law
and under the federal legislative scheme of the Trade-marks Act,
which provides a definition for ‘‘trade-mark” that is not limited to
registered marks. Accordingly, it applies to both registered and
unregistered trademarks, but only as defined: ‘‘a mark that is used
by a person for the purpose of distinguishing or so as to distinguish
goods or services manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by
him from those manufactured, sold, leased, hired or performed by
others.”74
(a) The Honest Trader
The very terminology of ‘‘trade-mark rights” conveys an
essential commitment: the grant of legal protection to a mark is
given in respect of a mark used in trade. The Merriam-Webster’s
Dictionary defines ‘‘trade” as ‘‘the business of buying and selling or
73

74

See Edward S. Rogers, Good Will, Trade-Marks and Unfair Trading (Chicago:
A.W. Shaw, 1914) ch. IV; Benjamin G. Paster, ‘‘Trademarks — Their Early
History” (1969) 59:8 Trademark Reporter 551; cited by Beverly W. Pattishal,
‘‘The Use Rationale and the Trademark Registration Treaty” (1974) 2:2 APLA
Q. J. 97 W. at 97-98.
TMA, supra note 5, s. 2 (‘‘trade-mark”) [emphasis added]. The section 2
definition of ‘‘trade-mark” also includes (b) a certification mark and (c) a
distinguishing guise. Use is currently a requirement of both as defined by s. 2,
and a precondition for the registration of a distinguishing guise under section 13
of the TMA (which explicitly requires use in Canada), and a certification mark
under section 23 (which defines registrability with reference to goods or services
‘‘in association with which the certification mark is used.”) [Emphasis added].
Ibid. ss. 13(1)(a), 23(1). The EAPA will repeal the ‘‘distinguishing guise”
definition and section 13, while the ‘‘certification mark” definition will be
amended to include a sign that is ‘‘proposed to be used.” Section 23 will be
amended accordingly. EAPA, ss. 319, 327, 334.
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bartering commodities;”75 a ‘‘mark” as ‘‘a symbol used for
identification or indication of ownership;”76 and, when combined,
a ‘‘trademark,” as ‘‘a device (such as a word) pointing distinctly to
the origin or ownership of merchandise to which it is applied and
legally reserved to the exclusive use of the owner as maker or
seller”.77 Such a practice-based understanding of a trademark
accords with its historical evolution as a mark used in the course of
trade. Gerald Ruston, in a fascinating account ‘‘On the Origin of
Trademarks,”78 traces the ‘‘practice of putting marks on goods.”
He writes:
During 6,000 odd years an enormous variety of races, in all
lands of the civilised world, have marked objects which they
owned or made, for various purposes. Some of these marks. . .
were. . .undoubtedly trademarks in the modern sense, that is to
say marks denoting origin; others were clearly marks identifying
the goods with their possessor.79

While distinguishing between a possessor mark and a
trademark, Ruston notes that ‘‘this distinction lies in the use the
mark was put to, and in turn on the conditions of trading and law
which existed. . . . [T]he same mark, placed by the same person on
the same goods, might serve both purposes at different times.”80 By
way of example, the old practice of branding cattle served to
identify ownership of the cattle as property. Once the cattle were
sold, ‘‘the brand would immediately become a trademark and tell
any purchaser who had reared the animal[s].”81 As such, the brand
also served a consumer protection role through the information it
communicated about the goods’ provenance. Ruston offers further
75

76

77

78

79
80
81

Merriam-Webster, sub verbo ‘‘trade”, online: <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/trade>.
Ibid. sub verbo ‘‘mark”, online: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mark>.
Ibid. sub verbo ‘‘trademark”, online: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/trademark>.
Gerald Ruston, ‘‘On the Origin of Trademarks” (1955) 45:2 Trademark
Reporter 127, drawing from the work of Frank I. Schechter, The Historical
Foundations of the Law Relating to Trade-marks” (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1925).
Ibid. at 127.
Ibid. at 127-28.
Ibid. at 128.
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examples: stone-age pottery bearing ‘‘markings of perhaps 5000
BC”;82 signs on jars buried in the tombs of 1st Dynasty Egyptian
kings; as well as on tools and building stones marked ‘‘by names of
gangs of slaves who quarried or transported them.”83 While some
such markings were descriptive of contents, others were clear
indications of the producer or origin. In Greece, from 400 BC,
common goods were marked with the symbols of potters, painters
and official marks.84 In Rome, makers’ marks were used on a wide
array of objects from medicine and wine to bronze vessels, with
some 6000 Roman potters’ marks (sigilli) being known and
analyzed.85 Where marks had value, imitations followed; even
then, counterfeits emerged by corollary, marked with copies of the
Roman sigilli.86 Ruston traces the use of marks through the Middle
East and Transylvania (dating back possibly as far 5000 BC).87 One
of the great mysteries of the Dark Ages, we are told, is the
disappearance of trademarks from pottery (although sword blades
continued to be marked), while by the Middle Ages, ‘‘trade-marks
became compulsory in respect of a great many different kinds of
merchandise.”88 Later still, Ruston documents the settlement of
agricultural communities who ‘‘used marks as land or boundary
marks and ultimately placed them on their houses. Those who
became merchants incorporated them into their trademarks. . ..”89
Three kinds of marks became ‘‘canalised into systems of common
or statute law” during this period: the family or House Mark;
private trade-marks voluntarily adopted; and the compulsory
system of marking.90 Common to all three was that the mark
connoted a relationship with an object and its source that was
based on, and forged by, honest use and was known to the relevant
community.91 The criminal law against counterfeits was the first
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Ibid.
Ibid. at 130-31.
Ibid. at 132.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 133.
Ibid. at 134.
Ibid. at 134-35.
Ibid. at 130.
Ibid. at 136.
Indeed with the family or house mark, ‘‘the penalty for fraudulently putting
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form of protection of marks and the precursor to modern day
trademark legislation.92
With the development of a market economy, the common law
evolved to protect markets and promote good behaviour by
extending legal protection for the reputation of goods, title, trade
identity and dress. The law thus guarded competitors’ economic
interests against impropriety and misrepresentation. From the tort
of conspiracy and intentional interference with economic
relations93 to injurious falsehood94 and even misappropriation,95
the reach of tort law has stretched to capture and protect
underlying economic interests where courts have perceived unfair
competition and restraint of trade. Such is the origin of the
common law tort of passing off, which gradually evolved to protect
any indicia in which a trader had built a reputation and goodwill.96

92

93

94

95

96

one’s own mark on another’s goods was banishment, which meant death by
starvation.” Ibid.
Currently, an expansive set of criminal regulations govern ‘‘forgery of trademarks and trade descriptions” under sections 406-21 of the Canadian Criminal
Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, including criminal passing off (s. 408), with penalties
ranging from up to two years of imprisonment as an indictable offence (s.
412(1)(a)) or a fine and/or imprisonment of up to six months as a summary
offence (ss. 412(1)(b), 787(1)).
E.g., Mogul Steamship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1892), [1892] A.C. 25,
[1891-94] All E.R. Rep. 263 (U.K. H.L.).
E.g., Ratcliffe v. Evans (1892), [1892] 2 Q.B. 524, [1891-94] All E.R. Rep. 699
(C.A.).
Though doubt remains as to the existence and scope of the tort of
misappropriation, the U.S. Supreme Court case of International New Service
v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 39 S.Ct. 68, 63 L.Ed. 211 (1918) exemplifies
the judicial instinct to protect against free riding as unfair competition through
the recognition (or creation) of quasi-proprietary interests over commercially
valuable intangibles. But see Moorgate Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Philip Morris Ltd.
(1984), 56 A.L.R 193, 156 C.L.R. 414 (H.C.A.); see also Swedac Ltd. v. Magnet
& Southerns Plc., [1989] 1 F.S.R. 243 (H.C.), Westfair Foods Ltd. v. Jim Pattison
Industries Ltd. (1990), 45 B.C.L.R. (2d) 253, 68 D.L.R. (4th) 481 (B.C. C.A.).
E.g., Powell v. Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co. Ltd., [1896] 2 Ch. 54 (C.A.),
aff’d [1897] A.C. 710 (U.K. H.L.). Justice LeBel, in Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings
Inc., describes the origins of passing off thus: ‘‘This tort has a long history. At a
very early point in its development, the common law became concerned with the
honesty and fairness of competition. For that reason, it sought to ensure that
buyers knew what they were purchasing and from whom. It also sought to
protect the interest of traders in their names and reputation. As far back as the
17th century, the court started to intervene. Actions based at first on some form
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At common law, rights to control such indicia and to prevent their
confusing use by others are thus premised on, and flow through,
their use in the course of trade. Without trade, there can be no
reputation, no goodwill and, therefore, no subject matter deserving
of the law’s protection.
This is not only the origin of our modern registered trademark
system, but its present-day parallel. Eventually, the exigencies of
industrialization necessitated a trademark registration system to
offer better but complementary protection through a searchable
register; its core condition remained, however, the market usebased, source-identifying function of the marks that resided on the
register.97 The concept of use as constitutive of the trademark’s
capacity to tell a true story as to trade source and quality — that is,
its capacity to distinguish — continues to operate as the
cornerstone of modern trademark law. Whatever their
commercial evolution, the legal purpose of trademarks remains a
guarantee of origin and, inferentially, an assurance as to quality. In
both respects, the law demands good information for consumers by
protecting against confusion and guaranteeing that the reputation
of a product, good or bad, will affect the goodwill enjoyed by the
producer. As the next section will show, the concept of use as
integral to the rights of the trademark owner has significant judicial
endorsement. Justice Binnie, for the Supreme Court of Canada in
Mattel U.S.A. Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., explained:

97

of deceit were allowed. . . The modern doctrine of passing off was built on these
foundations and because a part of Canadian law. Its principles now inform both
statute and common law.” Kirkbi AG v. Ritvik Holdings Inc., 2005 SCC 65,
[2005] 3 S.C.R. 302, 2005 CarswellNat 3631 at [63], LeBel J. [Kirkbi] [references
omitted].
The oldest trademark on the U.S. register, dating back to 1870, survives today
because it is still in use. See Peter Smith, ‘‘Underwood’s Deviled Ham: The
Oldest Trademark Still in Use” (March 9, 2012), online: Smithsonian.com
<https://www.smithsonianmag.com/arts-culture/underwoods-deviled-hamthe-oldest-trademark-still-in-use-119136583/>.
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Unlike other forms of intellectual property, the gravaman of
trade-mark entitlement is actual use. By contrast, a Canadian
inventor is entitled to his or her patent even if no commercial
use of it is made. A playwright retains copyright even if the play
remains unperformed. But in trade-marks the watchword is ‘‘use
it or lose it”.98

The ‘‘trademark as distinguishing source-identifier” is not
simply a story we tell ourselves about why the law intervenes in
public markets to protect private interests in trade symbols; it is,
rather, the story consistently told to us by the highest court in the
land. Examining the implications of use, as the following judicial
justifications reveal, is the primary mechanism by which the
balance between fair and free competition has been sought,
always with a view to protecting the actual link between symbol
and source.
(b) Judicial Justifications
Trademark law is commonly rationalized as a means by which
to protect both traders and the public against the consequences of
unfair competition and deceptive trade practices. The Supreme
Court of Canada, in Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v. Apotex Inc.,99
observed that the purposes of the passing-off action could be
explained with regard to ‘‘the persons who manufacture or market
the products (‘the manufacturers’), on the one hand, and on the
other to those for whom the products are intended, the persons who
buy, use or consume them (‘the consumers’).”100 Manufacturers
who have built up goodwill have, in the eyes of the law, acquired
quasi-proprietary rights in that goodwill and are entitled to be
protected against harmful and unfair competitive practices.
Consumers, moreover, are entitled to protection against dishonest
trade practices that could confuse or deceive them. In this way,
trademark law also serves a public interest and consumer
protection function. Justice Gonthier concluded: ‘‘It is clear that

98

Mattel U.S.A. Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., 2006 SCC 22, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 772,
2006 CarswellNat 1400 [Mattel] at [5], Binnie J. [emphasis added].
99
Ciba-Geigy Canada Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., [1992] 3 S.C.R. 120, 1992 CarswellOnt
1007, 44 C.P.R. (3d) 289, Gonthier J.
100
Ibid. at [38].
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however one looks at the passing-off action, its purpose is to
protect all persons affected by the product.”101
Landes and Posner have famously proposed an economic
perspective for rationalizing trademark protection.102 Like other
forms of intellectual property, trademarks are costly to create but
cheap and easy to replicate. By limiting free riding, trademark law
provides an incentive for traders to invest in the development of a
mark and so to maintain the quality of the products associated
therewith. The consumer benefits from this investment, as well as
from the reduced search costs that flow from the mark’s capacity to
identify the trade source in the marketplace.
Such a depiction of neatly aligned interests between different
parties in their various capacities is not always easy to maintain.
Both traders and consumers have an interest in free competition as
well as fair competition; at the heart of trademark policy is the
tension between these ideals. When the law intervenes to protect the
rights or interests of one party to fair competition, this represents a
choice to limit the means by which another may freely compete.
Similarly, an intervention to prevent consumer confusion may limit
the choice that would otherwise be available to consumers.
Moreover, the public has interests that extend beyond the
consumers’ interest in respect of particular goods or services, or
the marketplace in general.103 The Supreme Court of Canada has
consistently emphasized the significance of ‘‘use” in mediating such
interests and rationalizing the law’s intervention. In Kirkbi,104 the
court compares patent law’s focus on the protected product or
process with the focus of trademark law:
In the case of trade-marks, the focus shifts from the product
itself to the distinctiveness of its marketing. Trade-marks
seek to indicate the source of a particular product, process
or service in a distinctive manner, so that, ideally, consumers know what they are buying and from whom. The
definition of trade-marks in s. 2 of the Trade-marks Act
101

Ibid. at [39].
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, ‘‘Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective” (1987) 30:2 J. L. & Econ. 265.
103
These include the ability to criticize a brand in an exercise of expressive freedom
(e.g., through parody), or to share or receive information regarding a brand
(e.g., through comparative advertising). See below, Part 4.
104
Kirkbi, supra note 96.
102
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confirms this focus on distinctiveness in the market and in
the public[.]105

Later, the court asks, ‘‘Can the mark be the product itself?”
Answering ‘‘no,” it emphasizes the essential distinction between the
trademark as symbol and the product to which it is attached:
The goodwill associated with [trademarks] is considered to be
the most valuable form of property. However, despite its
connections with a product, a mark must not be confused with
the product - it is something else, a symbol of a connection
between a source of a product and the product itself.106

The amendments to the Trade-marks Act will effectively allow
registered marks to be protected in their own right, without in fact
symbolizing a connection between goods or services and their trade
source. Seen in this light, the question in Kirkbi takes on new
meaning, but the answer should remain unchanged: trademark law
should protect the mark as symbol, not as a product in itself.
Trademarks gain symbolic value precisely because they are used
in market trade. Over time, some allowance has been made for use
that is not local when the goodwill associated with the mark is107 —
but only to the extent that goodwill has been de facto acquired in
the particular field of activity.108 Where legal protection has been
conferred in the absence of use in the relevant market, it has been
judicially rationalized as protecting the consumer familiar with the
mark from confusion or deceit,109 and not in recognition of any
proprietary claim advanced as a matter of right by the trader (even
105

Ibid. at [39].
Ibid. [emphasis added].
107
See e.g., Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Pestco Co. of Canada (1985), 50 O.R. (2d)
726, 5 C.P.R. (3d) 433 (Ont. C.A.).
108
For example, Walt Disney Productions successfully enjoined the launch of an
amusement park called ‘‘Fantasyland” in the West Edmonton Mall: Walt
Disney Productions v. Triple Five Corp. (1994), 17 Alta. L.R. (3d) 225, 1994
CarswellAlta 39, 113 D.L.R. (4th) 229, 149 A.R. 112 (Alta. C.A.). It was unable
to enjoin use of ‘‘Fantasyland” for a hotel, however, because the mark had not
been used, and so had no goodwill, in connection with hotels: Walt Disney
Productions v. Fantasyland Hotel Inc.(1994), 20 Alta. L.R. (3d) 146 (Q.B.), aff’d
(1996), 38 Alta. L.R. (3d) 441, 1996 CarswellAlta 367 (Alta. C.A.) [WD Hotels].
109
This also explains why Canadian trademark law refrains from restricting
parallel imports, for example, in the absence of consumer confusion. See e.g.,
106
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against a competitor ‘‘cashing in” on the mark’s positive
associations).110 The only association meriting protection in the
eyes of the courts is the connection signified by the mark’s sourceidentifying function. Trademark owners’ successes in the struggle to
expand the proprietary mappings of their marks have consistently
been tied to use, acquired goodwill, and the likelihood of consumer
confusion.
In Mattel, the Supreme Court noted:
Merchandising has come a long way from the days when
‘‘marks” were carved on silver goblets or earthenware jugs to
identify the wares produced by a certain silversmith or potter.
Their traditional role was to create a link in the prospective
buyer’s mind between the product and the producer. 111

In declining to find that Mattel’s registered BARBIE mark had
sufficient fame to transcend its limited use in association with dolls,
the court opined:
The power of attraction of trade-marks and other ‘‘famous
brand names” is now recognized as among the most valuable of
business assets. However, whatever their commercial evolution,
the legal purpose of trade-marks continues . . . to be their use by
the owner ‘‘to distinguish wares or services manufactured, sold,
leased, hired or performed by him from those manufactured,
sold, leased, hired or performed by others”. It is a guarantee of
origin and inferentially, an assurance to the consumer that the
quality will be what he or she has come to associate with a
particular trade-mark (as in the case of the mythical ‘‘Maytag”
repairman). It is, in that sense, consumer protection legislation.112

The centrality of use as the basis of the trademark owner’s claim
to right is most apparent, however, when the court compares the
efforts that attract patent and copyright protection with those that
generate trademark protections, arriving at a justification — and
limiting principle — for trademark rights that turns on their use in
the marketplace:

Consumers Distributing Co. v. Seiko Time Canada Ltd., [1984] 1 S.C.R. 583,
1984 CarswellOnt 869.
110
See, e.g., WD Hotels, supra note 108.
111
Mattel, supra note 98 at [2] [emphasis added].
112
Ibid.
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a patentee must invent something new and useful. To obtain
copyright, a person must add some expressive work to the
human repertoire. In each case, the public through Parliament
has decided it is worth encouraging such inventions and
fostering new expression in exchange for a statutory monopoly
. . .. The trade-mark owner, by contrast, may simply have used a
common name as its ‘‘mark” to differentiate its wares from
those of its competitors. Its claim to monopoly rests not on
conferring a benefit on the public. . .but on serving an important
public interest in assuring consumers that they are buying from
the source from whom they think they are buying and receiving
the quality which they associate with that particular trade-mark.
Trade-marks thus operate as a kind of shortcut to get consumers
to where they want to go, and in that way perform a key function
in a market economy. Trade-mark law rests on principles of fair
dealing. It is sometimes said to hold the balance between free
competition and fair competition.113
Fairness, of course, requires consideration of the interest of the
public and other merchants and the benefits of open competition as well as the interest of the trade-mark owner in protecting
its investment in the mark. Care must be taken not to create a
zone of exclusivity and protection that overshoots the purpose
of trade-mark law. . . .114
The purpose of trade-marks is to create and symbolize linkages
. . ..115

As the foregoing reasons make apparent, use of a mark in the
activity of buying and selling goods or services is inherent to the
basic concept of the trademark right: the value of the mark arises
not from an abstract concept of property or just desert, but in the
relationship that the trader has developed between her goods or
services and her customers in connection with the mark. And, of
course, this practice-based, goodwill-dependent concept of a
trademark accords with its historical evolution over hundreds —
even thousands — of years: that is, as a marking used to identify a
product’s source. In short, trademark rights are, invariably, user
rights — and not simply because use is the basis for acquisition of
title, but also because use determines the scope of rights and their
necessary limits in a market characterized by the presence of other
users.
113

Ibid. at [21] [emphasis added].
Ibid. at [22].
115
Ibid. at [24], citing Kirkbi, supra note 96.
114
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As David Vaver has noted, ‘‘[a] mark owner who lets its mark’s
trade source message become muddied for any reason risks
invalidity.” 116 The meaning of the mark can easily be
compromised, for example, when the owner treats a trademark as
though it were akin to property by alienating it, whether by
licence117 or assignment,118 while failing to ensure the integrity of
its source-identifying message. Although legislation now permits
assignment with or without the goodwill of a business and in
connection with either all or some of the goods or services in
association with which the mark has been used, a mark must
consistently be used to identify the true trade source; any deviation
can compromise its distinctive message, severing the relationship
between the mark as signifier and the meaning it signifies to the
relevant universe of consumers — and, in doing so, deprive it of the
law’s protection.119
In Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Lte´e, the
Supreme Court reiterated this rationale for trademark protection,
asserting that ‘‘the purpose of trade-marks is to function as a
symbol of the source and quality of wares and services, to
116

David Vaver, Intellectual Property Law, 2nd. ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2011) at
543.
117
See, e.g., Abbott Laboratories Ltd. v. Apotex Inc., 1998 CarswellOnt 2159, 42
C.C.L.T. (2d) 317 (Ont. Gen. Div.) Abbott was denied an injunction to prevent
the marketing of generic tablets having an appearance similar to its brand name
tablets. The get-up was held not to distinguish Abbott as trade source given its
licensing arrangements with a third party generic manufacturer. (ibid. at [5]).
Rather, it was found to indicate therapeutic equivalence. (ibid. at [28]). See also
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Novopharm Ltd., 1997 CarswellNat 728, 130 F.T.R. 1, 73
C.P.R. (3d) 371 (F.C.T.D.) at [138].
118
See, e.g., Wilkinson Sword (Canada) Ltd. v. Juda, [1968] 2 Ex. C.R. 137, 51
C.P.R. 55, requiring a change in the trade source meaning of the mark to be
accompanied by education of the public. See also Heintzman v. 751056 Ontario
Ltd., 1990 CarswellNat 819, 38 F.T.R. 210 (F.C.T.D.).
119
Under subsection 48(1) of the TMA, a mark is transferable and always deemed
to have been so with or without the goodwill of the business and in respect to all
or some of the wares or services in association with which it has been used. As
per subsection 48(2), a mark may, nevertheless, be held not to be distinctive
should such transfer result in confusion. Similarly, under section 49, a mere
change of purpose is not enough to invalidate a mark; but a mark may be
invalidated if such a change would obscure the message of the mark, rendering it
not distinctive. TMA, supra note 5, ss. 48(1)-(2), 49, 18(1)(b). See also Breck’s
Sporting Goods Co. Ltd. v. Madger (trading as Sportcam Co.) (1975), [1976] 1
S.C.R. 527 at [12].
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distinguish those of the merchant from those of another, and
thereby to prevent ‘‘confusion” in the marketplace.”120
Finally, in the 2011 Masterpiece Inc. v. Alavida Lifestyles Inc.
decision, Canada’s most recent Supreme Court decision on
trademark law, Justice Rothstein wrote for the court:
Trade-marks in Canada are an important tool to assist
consumers and businesses. In the marketplace, a business marks
its wares or services as an indication of provenance. This allows
consumers to know, when they are considering a purchase, who
stands behind those goods or services. In this way, trade-marks
provide a ‘‘shortcut to get consumers to where they want to go.”
. . . Where the trade-marks of different businesses are similar, a
consumer may be unable to discern which company stands
behind the wares or services. Confusion between trade-marks
impairs the objective of providing consumers with a reliable
indication of the expected source of wares or services.121

As these decisions repeatedly make clear, ‘‘use” of a mark in
commerce is an integral and constitutive feature of a trademark,
and the jus of use provides the defining rationale for trademark
protection. With the implementation of the amendments, we must
wonder whether such judicial attitudes towards trademark law’s
purpose will have to shift in response to the severing of protection
from use. If (or when) they do, it will be interesting to see how
courts rationalize the operation of a system that has abandoned the
formative justification for the nature and scope of rights that it
grants.
Part 2 demonstrated that the trader’s entitlement to a mark
arises and survives only through the use of the mark. Part 3 has, to
this point, shown how the jus of use feeds the spirit of trademark
law (one might even say it is the trademark’s au jus, when we boil it
down). The regime exists not to encourage the creation of
trademarks, as the trademark is never the product nor end in
itself. Rather, the federal regime regulating registered and
unregistered marks is fundamentally, indeed constitutionally (as
we argue next) aimed at the encouragement of free and fair trade.
120

Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v. Boutiques Cliquot Lte´e, 2006 SCC 23, [2006] 1
S.C.R. 824, 2006 CarswellNat 1402 at [18], Binnie J.
121
Masterpiece Inc. v. Alavida Lifestyles Inc., 2011 SCC 27, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 387,
2011 CarswellNat 1613 at [1], Rothstein J. [emphasis added].
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Canada’s use-based system has established a deep-seated
understanding of the trademark scheme as justified in light of the
source-identifying function of trademarks when used in the
marketplace. Their protection has thus become an accepted tool
for encouraging fair competition and protecting consumers who
encounter and interpret the mark as a signifier of source. By losing
use as the basis for registration in the federal trademark legislation
and undermining the jus of use as developed in our longstanding
system of unfair competition law, the rationalizing rug is pulled out
from under the registered trademark scheme.
(c) Constitutional Powers
Removing the gate-keeping use of use could also pull the
constitutional rug out from under the federal parliament’s powers.
How will the federal government justify the exercise of the power to
regulate trade and commerce in the absence of actual trade or
commerce? As in the United States,122 patents and copyrights in
Canada are expressly provided for under the federal power,123
while federal trademark legislation depends for its constitutionality
on the regulation of trade and commerce power.124 Several cases
have addressed the constitutionality of provisions of Canada’s
Trade-marks Act and, wherever they were held to be intra vires, the
court pointed to the purpose of the relevant provision in rounding
out a federal scheme that protects goodwill and prevents confusion
in the marketplace. This, it seems, is the constitutional equation.
In Vapor Canada Ltd. v. MacDonald,125 paragraph 7(e) of the
Act, which purported to render unlawful ‘‘dishonest business
practices,” was held to be unconstitutional, though the remainder
122

See note 141 infra and accompanying text. Compare the Canadian and
American position to that of Australia where the federal power to regulate
trademarks, patents of inventions, and designs is explicitly conferred by section
51 of the Constitution of Australia. See Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, s. 51(xviii), online: <https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_practice_n_procedures/Constitution.aspx>.
123
Subsections 91(22) and 91(23) of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 3.
124
Ibid. ss. 91, 91(2).
125
Vapor Canada Ltd. v. MacDonald, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 134, 22 C.P.R. (2d) 1,
concerned a former employee absconding with trade-secrets. Paragraph 7(e)
provided that no person shall ‘‘do any other act or adopt any other business
practices contrary to honest industrial commercial usage in Canada.” It was
eventually repealed in 2014.
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of section 7 was found in obiter to be of qualified validity ‘‘in so far
as it may be said to round out regulatory schemes prescribed by
Parliament in the exercise of its legislative power in relation to. . .
trademarks.”126 Subsection 7(b), which is widely understood to be a
statutory version of passing off,127 was subsequently held ‘‘ultra
vires the federal legislative authority” in the trial level ruling of
Motel 6 Inc. v. No. 6 Motel Ltd.128 In an action that also attacked
the validity of the defendant’s registered marks, Justice Addy
‘‘fail[ed] to see. . .how s. 7(b) itself can be said to ‘round off federal
legislation regarding trademarks.’”129 In Asbjorn Horgard A/S v.
Gibbs/Nortac Industries Ltd.130 and Kirkbi,131 the constitutionality
of paragraph 7(b) was again tested but sustained insofar as it
protects ‘‘trade-marks,” whether registered or unregistered, from
harmful misrepresentation. In Kirkbi, the Supreme Court
concluded that the paragraph is ‘‘remedial; its purpose is to
enforce the substantive aspects of the Trade-marks Act relating to
unregistered trade-marks.”132 Justice LeBel continued:
If trade-marks are intended to protect the goodwill or reputation associated with a particular business and to prevent
confusion in the marketplace, then a comprehensive scheme
dealing with both registered and unregistered trade-marks is
necessary to ensure adequate protection. The inclusion of
unregistered trade-marks in the regulatory scheme is necessary
to ensure the protection of all trade-marks. The Trade-marks
Act is more than simply a system of registration.133

126

Ibid. at [64]. Section 7 of the TMA is found under the heading of ‘‘Unfair
Competition and Prohibited Marks” and effectively codifies unfair competition
torts into the federal regime.
127
Section 7(b) provides that no person shall ‘‘direct public attention to his wares,
services or business in such a way as to cause or likely to cause confusion. . .
between his wares, services or business and the wares, services or business of
another.” TMA, supra note 5, s. 7(b).
128
[1982] 1 F.C. 638, 127 D.L.R. (3d) 267 (F.C.T.D.)
129
Ibid. at [105].
130
Asbjorn Horgard A/S v. Gibbs/Nortac Industries Ltd., [1987] 3 F.C. 544, 1987
CarswellNat 867 (F.C.A.), MacGuigan J.
131
Kirkbi, supra note 96.
132
Kirkbi, supra note 96 at [25].
133
Ibid. at [31].
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Two things are fundamental to this finding. First, what connects
unregistered trademarks to the federal regime is their ‘‘use.” To be
constitutionally valid, the codified protection against passing off
was read down to apply only to those who can lay claim to a
‘‘trade-mark” as defined under section 2 of the Trade-marks Act,
thereby importing the technical requirement of ‘‘use” as deemed
under section 4. Second, what the federal regime seeks to protect is
not just any use but use as a trade-mark to distinguish trade source
thereby conferring a proprietary interest in the goodwill (the
attractive force that brings in custom) of traders as opposed to in
the mark per se. Indeed, in BMW Canada Inc. v. Nissan Canada
Inc., 134 BMW was unable to satisfy this technical ‘‘use”
requirement in order to establish an unregistered trademark in
‘‘M” or ‘‘M6” and so was unsuccessful in enjoining Nissan’s use of
similar marks. It is unclear whether Justice LeBel’s reasoning could
continue to find traction in a post-amendment scheme with a
reformed regulatory context that protects registered marks rather
than used marks, whether registered or unregistered, in which
goodwill resides. Without use, could it still be said that protection is
premised on rights in the goodwill attached to a mark, rather than
rights over the mark itself? And, if not, could this reignite the
constitutionality question for the Trade-marks Act as a whole?
The Act as a whole was found to be constitutional by the
Supreme Court in Kirkbi;135 but that determination may become
suspect if marks are protected on the basis of registration and in the
absence of actual use. The amendments remove from the section 2
definition of a trademark ‘‘a mark that is used” and replace it with
‘‘a sign or combination of signs that is used or proposed to be used
by a person for the purpose of distinguishing or so as to distinguish
their goods or services from those of others.”136 A trademark will
be defined not on the basis of its use in the marketplace, but by its
capacity (including only a potential but unrealized capacity) to
distinguish source. Without requiring use as a precondition to
ownership under the federal scheme, one might wonder whether the
federal legislation could be justified as an exercise of Parliament’s
trade and commerce power. By implication, where no actual use of
a mark is required, there may be no actual trade or commerce
134

BMW Canada Inc. v. Nissan Canada Inc., 2007 FCA 119.
Kirkbi, supra note 96.
136
EAPA, supra note 14, s. 319(4).
135
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associated with the applied-for mark.137 Without trade, what
remains is the bare assertion of title, as section 19 of the TradeMarks Act confers an exclusive right to use the mark throughout
Canada in respect of the goods and services in association with
which it is registered. Moreover, subsection 53.2(1) confers to the
court the power to order civil remedies in respect of any act done
contrary to the Trade-Marks Act. Property and civil rights, in the
absence of trade, are in the exclusive jurisdiction of provincial
governments to regulate under subsection 92(13) of the Canadian
Constitution.
In the United States, ‘‘no trade, no trademark” has long been a
maxim of trademark law.138 As established in the landmark
Trademark Cases, Congress’ power to regulate trademarks flows
from the ‘‘commerce clause” of the U.S. Constitution.139 It follows
that federal trademark legislation can be enacted only with respect
to the kind of commerce that Congress has the power to regulate
under this clause: only by instituting a ‘‘use in commerce”
requirement was Congress able to create a national trademark
system.140 Just as the ‘‘use in commerce” requirement for
registration found in the U.S. law is ‘‘rooted in the Constitutional
limitations on what the legislative branch can govern,”141 so, too, is
the use requirement for Canadian trademark registration rooted in
the Constitutional limitations on the federal ‘‘trade and commerce”
power. It is thus foreseeable that, once the legislative amendments
are implemented, the constitutionality of the Trade-marks Act will
be challenged anew — and rightly so.

137

For an excellent discussion of the post-Amendment constitutionality of the
federal regime, see Bereskin, ‘‘Constitutional Quicksand”, supra note 7.
138
Willis Raymond Davis Jr., ‘‘Intent-to-Use Applications for Trademark
Registration” (1989) 35:3 Wayne L. Rev. 1135 at 1141, citing inter alia, United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
139
U.S. Const. art. I, §8 cl. 3. See Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), cited in
Davis Jr., ibid. at 1142.
140
Aaron & Nordemann, supra note 70 at 1191. The first U.S. federal trademark
statute, the Trademark Act of 1870, ch. 230, §§ 677-84, 16 Stat. 210 (1870), which
did not require use, was considered unconstitutional as per the decisions in the
Trademark Cases. See Davis Jr., supra note 138 at 1141-42.
141
Aaron & Nordemann, ibid.
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4. LOSING THE USE OF USE
(a) Legitimacy Compromised
Critical as the constitutional division of powers may be to the
legitimacy of the registered trademark scheme, the loss of use as a
threshold requirement of protection ought not to be reduced to a
technical matter of federal jurisdiction — there are broader
constitutional principles at stake.142 In the absence of trademark
use, applicants and registered trademark owners can accumulate
marks as though they were mere assets, monopolizing meanings
without advancing the underlying objectives of the regime. In the
absence of trade, unused registered marks, operating as propertized
commodities, will attract exclusive rights that may unduly hamper
the freedom of other commercial and public actors to engage in
commercial speech.143
Canadian courts have yet to fully engage with or satisfactorily
address the limits placed on freedom of expression by the
protection and enforcement of trademark rights. Admittedly, this
omission is not for want of opportunity: in Cie ge´ne´rale des
e´tablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie v. CAW-Canada,144 the
defendant trade union argued that prohibiting the use of a
corporate trademark in its organizing campaign would be an

142

Where Canada’s international trade and investment agreements require
intellectual property protection and enforcement, implementing legislation
could fall under a liberally interpreted federal jurisdiction over trade, or as part
of the general jurisdiction of the federal government to pass laws for the Peace,
Order and Good Government of Canada in relation to matters not falling
within the specific classes of subjects in sections 91 and 92. See Vapor Canada v.
MacDonald, supra note 125 at [61]-[63].
143
In Council of Natural Medicine College of Canada v. College of Traditional
Chinese Medicine Practitioners and Acupuncturists of British Columbia, 2013 FC
287, 109 C.P.R. (4th) 260, the constitutionality of subparagraph 9(1)(n)(iii), an
official marks provision, was challenged, inter alia, as ultra vires the federal
power and in violation of the right of free expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. For the latter claim, the requirement of use was seen to
perform a gatekeeping function that supported a finding of minimal impairment of Charter rights. (ibid. at [99]).
144
Cie. ge´ne´rale des e´tablissements Michelin-Michelin & Cie. v. CAW-Canada, 1996
CarswellNat 2297, [1997] 2 F.C. 306, 124 F.T.R. 192, 71 C.P.R. (3d) 348,
Teitelbaum J. [Michelin].
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unconstitutional restriction on the right of freedom of expression as
guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.145
Finding no trademark infringement, the issue was moot; but the
Federal Court was content to hold that the defendants’ right to
freedom of expression was not restricted by enjoining its use of the
plaintiff’s intellectual property: ‘‘The Charter does not confer the
right to use private property - the Plaintiff’s copyright - in the
service of freedom of expression.”146 Recently, the Federal Court
had another opportunity to examine the evident tension between
free speech and trademark protection when it held, in United
Airlines, Inc. v. Cooperstock, 147 that a consumer gripe site,
United.com, infringed United Airlines’ registered trademark. Even
while issuing an injunction restraining the defendant’s use of a
parodic variation on the corporate logo, the court cursorily
dismissed ‘‘the Defendant’s suggestion that freedom of speech is
at issue in this litigation.”148
The judicial refusal to identify and critically assess the tensions
that transparently pervade the relationship between free speech
rights and intellectual property suggests a general reluctance to
embark on an exercise of constitutionally justifying the restrictions
that trademark law places on speech.149 While there is debate about
145

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Charter].
146
Michelin, supra note 144 at [85]. Justice Teitelbaum explicitly stated that the
conclusion would apply equally to the infringement provisions of the Trademarks Act, at [82].
147
United Airlines, Inc. v. Cooperstock, 2017 FC 616, 147 C.P.R. (4th) 251
(F.C.T.D.), Phelan J. [Cooperstock].
148
Ibid. at [16]. For a fulsome discussion of the treatment of gripe sites and parody
cases that predates this case, see Rosemary Coombe & Andrew Herman,
‘‘Culture Wars on the Net: Intellectual Property and Corporate Propriety in
Digital Environments”, online: <http://www.nyu.edu/steinhardt/e/pdf/humsocsci/mias/readings07/20.pdf>.
149
On the ‘‘perilous” balance between trademark and freedom of expression rights
in Canada, see Teresa Scassa, ‘‘Trademarks Worth a Thousand Words:
Freedom of Expression and the Use of the Trademarks of Others” (2012) 53 Les
Cahiers de Droit 877 [A Thousand Words]. See also Carys J. Craig, ‘‘Perfume by
Any Other Name May Smell as Sweet. . .But Who Can Say?: A Comment on
L’Oreal v. Bellure” (2010) 22 I.P.J. No. 3, 319 at 323-31 [Perfume]. We have
written separately on freedom of expression and intellectual property
constraints on speech in the context of copyright law. See Carys J. Craig,
‘‘Putting the Community in Communication: Dissolving the Conflict between
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whether registration confers a positive right to use the mark,150
there is no debate that it confers a negative right to exclude — and
thereby to silence — others from using the mark, a confusingly
similar mark or even one likely to depreciate its value. Whether
these restrictions on speech can be justified as a reasonable limit on
the constitutional right of freedom of expression remains a bigger
issue best left for another day.151 For our purposes, let us posit that
prohibiting the confusing use and registration of a mark that is
already used by another trader to identify source in the marketplace
could be a reasonable limit on free commercial expression. Even if
such a conclusion is taken as given, however, the removal of use as
a precondition of statutory protection changes the constitutional
equation in a subtle but important way. Arguably, restrictions on
expression are reasonable under the use-based system because
protection of a mark is fundamentally protection of its
communicative function in relation to the wares or services with
which it was associated by the purchasing public. The honest use of
a trademark by the registered trademark owner can itself be
conceived of as an expressive act worthy of the law’s protection.
Freedom of Expression and Copyright Law” (2006) 56:1 U.T.L.J. 75; Bita
Amani, ‘‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression: Fair Dealing Between Work
and Play” in Rosemary Coombe, Darren Wershler & Martin Zeilinger, eds.,
Dynamic Fair Dealing: Creating Canadian Culture Online (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2014) 43. In a forthcoming work, we consider freedom of
expression and its limits in the context of the prohibition on scandalous,
obscene and immoral marks in paragraph 9(1)(j) of the TMA: Bita Amani &
Carys Craig, ‘‘New Slants on Trademark Slurs and Immoral Marks” [New
Slants] (on file with the authors).
150
See Molson Canada v. Oland Breweries Ltd., 2002 Carswell Ont 1747, 59 O.R
(3d) 607 (Ont. C.A.) at [16]; but see also Cardinal v. Rogers Communications
Inc., 2017 HRTO 570 (Ont. Human Rights Trib.), online: <http://canlii.ca/t/
h40m6>, at [30]-[40]: ‘‘[N]either the Trade-marks Act nor the international
treaties relied upon . . . provide an unfettered right to use a trade-mark that is
immune from provincial laws of general application such as the Code.” (ibid. at
[40]). See also Amani & Craig, ‘‘New Slants”, ibid.
151
Under section 1, the Charter ‘‘guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it
subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society.” The test established in R. v. Oakes,
[1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, identifies criteria for assessing the constitutionality of such
limits: the limiting law must pursue a sufficiently important objective; it must be
rationally connected to that objective; it must impair the right no more than is
necessary to accomplish it; and it must not have a disproportionately severe
effect on the persons to whom it applies.
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Without actual trade, however, in the absence of any reputation or
distinctiveness acquired in connection with goods and services, and
without any actual consumers to potentially confuse, such
limitations are surely more difficult to justify. To fully protect
unused marks just because they are sitting on a register has a far
more tenuous (indeed, less rational) connection to the objectives of
the law, and can hardly be said to ‘‘minimally impair” the rights
and expressive freedoms of others.
In Canada, the technical requirement of trademark use has
served as a filter not only for registrability but also for
infringement. The system regulates the use of trademarks by nonowners — but not just any use. To infringe an owner’s right, a
defendant must have used the registered mark or a confusingly
similar mark in a commercial context and in a manner caught by
the same statutory definition of trademark use. With the exception
of claims alleging ‘‘depreciation of goodwill,” the unsuccessful
defendant must also have ‘‘used” the mark ‘‘as a trademark.”152 By
restricting the legal wrong to commercial, source-identifying uses of
the mark, the law provides a significant safeguard for the public’s
non-commercial, nominative or communicative engagement with
the protected trademark.153 If the transition to registering unused
marks portends the increased propertization of trademarks,
however, it may also expand the reach of the owner’s exclusive
152

See Clairol International Corp. v. Thomas Supply & Equipment Co., [1968] 2 Ex.
C.R. 552 [Clairol]. Using the registered mark as a trademark in association with
the same goods or services will be an infringement under section 19; using a
confusing mark as a trademark will be deemed infringement under section 20.
Section 22 makes it an infringement to use a registered trademark ‘‘in a manner
that is likely to have the effect of depreciating the value of the goodwill attaching
thereto,” potentially capturing uses that have neither the purpose nor effect of
distinguishing trade source. TMA, supra note 5, ss. 19, 20, 22. For an interesting
discussion, in the U.S. context, of use as a limiting principle in trademark
infringement cases, see Mark A. Lemley & Stacey L. Dogan, ‘‘Grounding
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use”, 98 Trademark Rep. 1345 (2008).
153
Cp. Canada Safeway Ltd. v. Manitoba Food & Commercial Workers, Local 832,
1983 CarswellMan 118, 25 C.C.L.T. 1 (Man. Q.B.) at [10]: ‘‘I do not think
[trademark laws] prevent individuals, corporations, or even competitors from
using the trademark of another for purposes unrelated to protection for
commercial or trade reasons.. . .Others may use the trademark if the purpose is
only to identify the holder. . .I am satisfied the Canadian trademark law does
not intrude into this area. If it were otherwise, that law would represent a rather
significant restriction on free speech and the circulation of ideas or opinions.”
Cited by Scassa, ‘‘A Thousand Words”, supra note 149 at 893.
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rights. It remains to be seen, for example, whether section 20
confusion liability could creep beyond the field of use, allowing a
mark to transcend its attachment to particular goods or services on
the wings of fame.154 It is clear, however, that the protection of
unused marks can only exacerbate the myriad ways in which
statutory protection for trademarks already serves to chill or limit
speech.
First, as Cooperstock 155 underscores, the doctrines that
constrain trademark law’s reach to commercial trademark uses
are not always sufficiently robust or respected to perform the
function attributed to them in circumscribing an owner’s claim. In
that case, Justice Phelan observed that ‘‘[t]here is no explicit
requirement in the legislation of a monetary or commercial element
to services,” with the result that the mere provision of ‘‘information
services” for the benefit of the public could be caught.156 Needless
to say, providing information is an expressive act. The same case
also emphasized that ‘‘parody and satire are not defences to
trademark infringement,”157 with the consequence that even
expressive, parodic and non-confusing uses of a mark could run
afoul of a registered trademark owner’s rights. Statutory trademark
law suffers from a lack of explicit defences or user rights within the
Act,158 meaning that limitations on the owner’s exclusivity must be
found within the internal logic of the system and its doctrines (a
logic that begins to falter when use is no longer a prerequisite to
protection). A person exercising her user right, under copyright
154

See e.g., Mattel U.S.A. Inc. v. 3894207 Canada Inc., 2006 SCC 22, [2006] 1
S.C.R. 772, 2006 CarswellNat 1400 [Mattel] and Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin v.
Boutiques Cliquot Lte´e, 2006 SCC 23, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 824, 2006 CarswellNat
1402 [Veuve Clicquot].
155
Cooperstock, supra note 147.
156
Ibid. at [33].
157
Ibid. The absence of a statutory defence of parody should not prevent it from
being read in on the basis of fundamental Charter rights. Cp., Laugh it Off
Promotions CC v. South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a
Sabmark International and Another (CCT42/04), [2005] ZACC 7, 2006 (1) SA
144 (CC); 2005 (8) BCLR 743 (CC) (27 May 2005), at [65].
158
Vaver, supra note 116 at 681. The trader ought not to be regarded as the sole
author of the mark, entitled to control its meaning and message. See generally,
Rosemary Coombe, The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties (Durham: Duke
University Press, 1998); see also Stephen Wilf, ‘‘Who Authors Trademarks?”
(1999). Faculty Articles and Papers. 74, online: <http://opencommons.uconn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1073&context=law_papers>.
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law, to parody a logo, for example, could find herself liable for
trademark infringement (as logos may attract copyright protection
too).159 The failure of the Trade-marks Act to explicitly protect
non-traders’ user rights is inimical to the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the Charter. As for the rights of other traders, the
Act contains no explicit exception or defence, for example, for nonmisleading uses of marks for comparative advertising purposes,
which may therefore attract depreciation liability no matter how
truthful or fair, if the result is to entice goodwill away from the
registered mark.160 Even leaving aside the inadequacy of trademark
law’s internal constraints, there is the ever-present risk of
overreaching claims being made by trademark owners, whether in
good faith or bad, which inevitably chill lawful uses of marks in
circumstances where ceasing and desisting makes more sense than
persisting and litigating.
The potential for such limitations on a trader’s speech are to be
tolerated, perhaps, in the effort to protect the communicative value
of the trademark owner’s speech and the fair and informative
purposes that it serves. The trademark as source-identifier could be
regarded as privileged expression to be favoured over the
misrepresentative, confusing or misappropriated speech of third
party traders.161 Looking beyond the balance of speech interests
between the particular parties implicated in a trademark dispute,
even limitations on third party commercial speech might be
considered justifiable intrusions on expressive rights in light of
other democratic goals including the promotion of fair and free
competition, trade and commerce. Once again, however, the
potential for such protection to silence others’ speech in the
absence of any actual trade or communicative use in the
marketplace fundamentally changes the constitutional equation.

159

See Kraft Canada Inc. v. Euro-Excellence Inc., 2007 SCC 37, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 20,
2007 CarswellNat 2087. Such a scenario could present a worthy case for
equitable estoppel, though it did not appear to concern Justice Phelan in
Cooperstock, supra note 147.
160
See Clairol, supra note 152. See also Craig, ‘‘Perfume”, supra note 149.
161
Even this reasoning does not extend to justify the potential breadth of section 22
depreciation liability.
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(b) Bait and Switch: Incentives and Implications
What follows from these changes to the traditional trademark
story? At the outset, we have switched trademark law’s protagonist
— the honest trader of goods and services — for one that is, at best,
a would-be trader of goods and services. Worse, we have welcomed
an antagonist: a trader whose interests lie in nothing more than
occupying and trading in registered marks and exploiting others for
personal gain. The potential implications are profound.
Consider, for example, that a registered owner may seek and
obtain an injunction against a common law user of the same or a
confusingly similar mark under the infringement provisions of the
Trade-marks Act.162 A registered owner may also invoke the
registration as a defence to any passing off action brought against
him,163 and, after five years on the register, may even assert the
registration to insulate the mark from challenges to title brought by
prior users. Under subsection 17(1), a prior use or making known
in Canada of a mark is a valid ground on which to attack the
validity of a registered mark. But in its current form, subsection
17(2) (untouched by the amendments) shields a registered owner
who adopted the mark in good faith from such a title challenge
after five years on the register.164 A party who had previously used
or made known the mark or a confusingly similar one could be
prevented from asserting her better title over a registered party who
may never have used the mark at all. In this foreseeable scenario,
the registered owner of an unused mark would effectively supplant
(or, notionally, expropriate) the common law rights of the owner of
an unregistered mark used in the course of trade.165 Because a mark
162

TMA, supra note 5, ss. 19, 20, 22.
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currently has to be used in order to be registered, the obvious
rationale for insulating title is to protect the registered owner’s
presumed investment in the mark after a significant period of time
on the register. As between two good faith users of confusing
marks, it may make sense to shield the registered owner’s rights
from those of an unknown and unregistered prior user if one is
looking to incentivize early registration and efficient ordering.166 In
the revised system, however, the registered owner of an unused
mark will enjoy a windfall of sorts: the mark on the register, if not
summarily expunged for non-use or invalidated for
abandonment,167 can preclude continued use or further expansion
by a legitimate common law rights holder.168 A registered mark
without use serves only as a placard for potential market meaning
and yet has the power to severely restrict the commercial activities
and speech of a common law user and rights-holder.
Commenting on the existing law, David Vaver asserts:
[w]ithout “use” a trade-mark is nothing. . .. Anyone holding an
unused mark probably cannot or does not want to invest in it,
may just want to play dog in the manger and block competitors
from using it, or may want to get into the business of selling
marks, not goods or services. None of this is worth encouraging
and the system treats him as an undesirable.169

law of the property interest in the goodwill attached to its mark when a third
party secures its registration, and may qualify for a concurrent use order under
section 21 if the registration is protected by subsection 17(2). Upon application
to the court, a confusing mark used in good faith prior to the date of filing of the
application for registration of a registered mark may continue to be used within
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use ‘‘is not contrary to the public interest.” Ibid. s. 21(1).
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Yet the amendments encourage precisely this behaviour, as though
it were suddenly worthy of ex ante incentives or ex post reward. The
number of unused registered marks can be expected to explode
exponentially under the reformed regime even if attendant
safeguards are to be built in by regulation. Further demands will
be placed on the administrative system in order to police the
proliferation of marks, with anticipated spikes in oppositions and
invalidity challenges. Currently, all registered and unregistered
marks have their genesis in use, although some fall out of use and
must be cleared as deadwood from the register. Under the revised
regime, it is anticipated that many more marks will be registered
and a large portion will be, effectively, Dead On Arrival. To clear
such marks from the register will require a much larger
administrative undertaking — with CIPO acting as undertaker.
Not only will the good faith and lawful use of the revised
registration scheme present such problems — these will no doubt be
exacerbated when the gates swing open to trademark registration
abuse. When use is no longer ‘‘the gravaman” of entitlement in
Canadian law, secondary incentives may arise to treat trademarks
as assets and tradable commodities, engaging in what one might
call ‘‘trademark trafficking.”170 The absence of a use requirement
for registrants will create an enticing invitation to stockpile
registered trademarks, ‘‘squatting” on them opportunistically for
future sale or licence, in a similar vein to the domain name
‘‘cybersquatting” that marked the growth of Internet commerce.
Anticipating a future entrant into the Canadian marketplace, an
applicant could secure registration of a trade-mark in Canada and
‘‘sit” on it until maximum value can be extracted from the would-be
owner who has invested in acquiring rights to the mark abroad. The
revised regime will thus offer fertile new ground for so-called
trademark ‘‘trolling”: a lawful but wasteful activity whereby nonactive registrants assert rights against actual or would-be users of
the mark purely to obtain settlements or extract sums for
assignment. A demonstrable absence of any intent to use the
mark may be a basis on which an application can be refused or
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opposed under the revised registration scheme.171 In a system where
valid and enforceable rights do in fact flow from registration
without use, however, one must query whether and on what basis
such strategic registrations could be condemned as ‘‘bad faith.”
With the elimination of use as a precondition for registration,
Canada may also come to suffer the negative effects of so-called
‘‘trademark cluttering.” The register could quickly become
cluttered with unused trademarks, which may be registered in
association with an extensive and indiscriminate list of goods and
services for the purpose of ‘‘place-holding” on the register. The
most expansive statements of goods and services are likely to come
from the applicants with the deepest pockets. Meanwhile, the
transaction costs and practical or legal obstacles involved in
navigating through a thicket of registered marks will be borne by all
new applicants and traders in the marketplace, and
disproportionately so by those who cannot afford costly
opposition and invalidation proceedings.
In April 2012, the U.K. Intellectual Property Office released
‘‘Trade Mark Cluttering: An Exploratory Report.”172 The report
defined cluttered trade mark registers as ‘‘registers containing such
a large number of unused or overly broad trade marks, that the
costs of creating and registering new marks substantially increase
for other applicants. Furthermore, the problem of cluttering
becomes systemic if existing levels of cluttering lead later
applicants to adopt application strategies that further contribute
to the problem.”173 It noted that, ‘‘as unused trade marks become
more prevalent, the cost of identifying new names or signs rises and
the probability of successfully registering new marks falls.”174 The
report identified as the ‘‘core problem of cluttering” that ‘‘the
creation and existence of unused trade marks on trade mark
registers . . . might block entry of new products.”175 The costs are
171
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borne not only by the would-be applicants for registration, then,
but ultimately by the consumer.
It seems inevitable that the elimination of use as a requirement
for registration will incentivize the registering of unused marks in
Canada and raise the costs associated with navigating through
them. Critically, the report identifies the ‘‘use requirement” as one
factor that may alleviate cluttering problems: ‘‘[s]trict use
requirements can make cancellation and opposition more
effective in reducing cluttering and vice versa.”176 It seems clear
that the problems identified in this U.K. report are likely to be
exacerbated in Canada and internationally once the amendments to
the Trade-marks Act come into force. Less clear is why Canada
should assume these risks and bear these costs.
Shifting the Canadian system to a filing system not predicated
on use may simplify the application process both for applicants and
the Trademark Office, but any efficiency gains will be offset by the
costs associated with the predictable proliferation of application
filings, particularly by foreign and well-resourced entities. It would
be perfectly rational and appropriate for counsel to advise their
clients to file multiple and sweeping applications. Indeed, anecdotal
evidence suggests that such practices are already well underway,
which may have a ratchet-up effect, motivating other counsel to
follow suit rather than lose a perceived competitive edge for their
clients. Incentivizing strategically premature and overly expansive
applications, and producing increased reliance on the opposition
mechanism to police the system, will raise costs for local and
national traders trying to carve out space in the market and on the
register. It will likely also generate greater preference for parties to
litigate in the already overburdened Federal Court of Canada177 in
order to remove the blocking marks from the register. Overall, of
course, these changes will increase the burden of administering the
system, with much of the cost being borne by the taxpayer and
little, if any, benefit flowing back to consumers and the public in
return.
176
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It may still be possible that appropriately bold regulatory
solutions could mitigate these harms when the amendments
eventually take effect. The obvious low hanging fruit would be to
require, for example, a declaration of intention to use in an
application for an unused mark; a statement of the date of first use
and/or country of use, in an application to register a mark that has
in fact been used; and a declaration of use in order to secure the
renewal of a registered mark. Such regulatory mechanisms may
allow for some graduated or iterative examination of a mark’s use
or an applicant’s bona fide intent, as well as providing important
information for people searching the register, and an opportunity
to identify misrepresentations that might render a registration
invalid. Our purpose here, however, is not to propose regulatory
fixes to ill-conceived statutory amendments. In our view, nothing
short of repealing the amendments or reintroducing the use
requirement as a precondition to registration will answer the
principled critique advanced in this article. If trademarks in Canada
transition away from their historical origins and traditional
justifications, their trajectory does not bode well for Canadian
traders, consumers or the public — or for the constitutional validity
and perceived legitimacy of the federal trademark scheme.
5. TRADEMARKS IN TRANSITION
The amendments to Canada’s Trade-marks Act suggest a
national registration system in transition. But the big picture of
‘‘trademarks in transition” captures a larger frame: the changing
nature of trademarks in the tides of global trade. We have given
short shrift to the dubious claim that the removal of a use
requirement is somehow mandated by Canada’s international
obligations. There is little doubt, however, that international
trade pressures are pointing increasingly and unremittingly in the
direction of easy and efficient cross-border registration of
trademarks for the benefit of multinational corporate actors and
their brands. Ease and efficiency have an appealing ring to them,
but, in the context of a trademark regime, they inevitably translate
into appeals for protection without the burdens of actual use.
Consider, for example, the natural interests of a successful U.S.
company doing business in the United States. Canada is a large
country geographically, but a small market economically, with
bilingual packaging laws and a relatively weak dollar. With these
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factors in mind, the U.S. company might readily conclude that the
costs of doing business in Canada will not bring sufficient benefits
to justify market expansion over the border. But the geographical
proximity of Canada and the ease of cross-border flow of goods
and goodwill also mean that use of a confusingly similar mark by a
commercial actor in Canada could quickly percolate into the U.S.
consumer consciousness. Simply put, the U.S. trademark owner has
a greater interest in controlling its mark in Canada than in
conducting business here. A Canadian registration without actual
use allows it to get the best of both worlds, while local Canadian
businesses are denied the right to use the mark or anything similar,
and Canadian consumers are deprived of the goods or services
offered south of the border by the registered trademark owner.
It should be acknowledged that even in the domestic picture, at
least for the more powerful commercial actors who may stake a
position in such policy debates, early and easy protection will likely
prove too attractive to resist. Under the current subsection 16(3),
foreign-registered trademark owners are already permitted to
register their marks in Canada before they commence to use their
marks here, even leap-frogging domestic users to claim prior title
on the basis of a foreign application to register.178 There is an
obvious appeal, for the large Canadian business that competes on
the international stage, to holding multiple registrations in a
strategic bid to get the first mover advantage and the competitive
upper hand. Frankly, against these powerful corporate interests at
home and abroad, there seems little hope that the interests of
consumers, the general public and small-scale local commercial
actors will hold much sway.
Canada is currently teetering on the notional dividing line
between the U.S. use-based system and the European registrationbased system,179 and is encountering pressures from both directions
in the development and harmonization of intellectual property
norms in the course of international trade negotiations.180 In this
global picture, the United States is beginning to look like the last
178
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bastion of a use-based trademark system.181 One might surmise
that it is therefore likely to be swept up in the global tide towards
registration-based trademark protection; but perhaps more likely,
consistent as it would be with the Realpolitik of the international
intellectual property order, is that U.S. corporate interests will
continue to be the beneficiaries of low registration thresholds
around the world while simultaneously benefitting from the higher
domestic threshold requirements that will keep foreign competitors
at bay. Simply put, Canada has gifted U.S. corporate interests a
comparative advantage in trademark acquisition — and, therefore,
in trade and commerce.182
If we are moving inevitably along a trademark policy trajectory
towards a primacy-of-registration system on a global scale, it
behooves us to ask whether we in Canada and across the common
law world can hold onto our traditional justifications for the
trademark system. Is the very idea of ‘‘the trademark” now a
misrepresentation? Is it deceptively misdescriptive, if you will, of a
system that seeks to protect, not the association between a mark
and the trade source in the mind of a buying consumer, but rather,
the first-to-file in a bureaucratic machinery that privileges the wellresourced, stymies actual use in trade and public discourse, and
compounds distributional inequalities?
While Canada provides the context and immediate motivation
for this discussion, it also offers a vantage point from which to view
the larger policy questions that present themselves on the world
stage, from Europe to the United States and beyond. Situating
Canada’s trademark law reforms within the shifting sands of
trademarks in transition reveals a broader critique about the
changing nature of trademark protection internationally. In the
new landscape, the trademark is the commodity. A registration
system that protects unused marks takes signs devoid of
communicative significance and imbues them with legal
significance, granting the power to prohibit others’ use. As marks
evolve from powerful identifiers of trade source to simple vehicles
of power, how should we balance the interests of owners and non181
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owners, corporations, consumers and citizens? How should we
mediate the fraught line between fair and unfair competition? In the
face of such tensions, how we design our regulatory structures and
intellectual property regimes ‘‘can have a profoundly positive or
negative consequence for economic growth and welfare.” 183
Without the jus of use, the trademark system is on increasingly
treacherous terrain.
6. CONCLUSION: KEEPING IT REAL
This article has explored the significance and potential
implications of the recent amendments to Canada’s Trade-marks
Act, assessing the extent to which they undermine the traditional
rationales for trademark protection and the federal registration
regime, as well as the various ways in which they threaten to
incentivize undesirable behaviour by opportunistic commercial
actors to the detriment of consumers and bona fide traders. As we
have argued, the enactment of the amendments represents an
important departure from the source-identifying function of a
trademark in Canada, garnered traditionally through use of the
mark, and takes us a step closer to treating registered marks as
tradable commodities to be claimed (rather than legally privileged
symbols to be earned and maintained). Given the considerable
challenges that may flow from such a fundamental shift in
Canadian trademark policy — and the absence of any obvious
resulting public benefit — this ought to weigh heavily against the
implementation of the amendments and to inform any regulatory
treatment or subsequent judicial interpretation thereof.
It is, admittedly, rarely the case that law accurately reflects the
lived realities of those whose behaviour it regulates; but when the
very rationale for legal protection depends on those realities, the
divergence between legal rules and real life can provoke a crisis of
legitimacy. The rationale for trademark law has long depended, in
the common law world, on consumer realities (from demonstrating
distinctiveness to proving a likelihood of confusion), which
establish the existence and scope of the rights that the law
protects. The jus of use has played a central role in tethering
registered trademark rights to the real-world marketplace in which
183
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real consumers encounter and attribute real meaning to them in
their actual decision-making processes, for better or worse. As a
matter of both principle and practice, without the jus of use, the
marks on the Register may be more fictional than real, casting into
doubt the legitimacy of our system for allocating exclusive control
over such indicia.
In his work on the origin and history of trademarks, Ruston
quotes the Bible’s Book of Revelations: ‘‘. . .that no man might buy
or sell save he that had the mark.”184 Let it be also said that no
person should have a mark save he or she that buy or sell. . .
something for God’s sake!
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